The Cynic
The first crisis window has passed: the Russian offensive has been stopped
To begin with, we carefully read the February publication on calculating risk points and key scenarios.
Now let’s recreate the picture from the point of the loss of Avdiivka in a little more detail. And we delve a little deeper into the future “peaks” of military activity.
1. Ukraine, as a result of the lack of military assistance from partners and allies, is losing Avdiivka.
2. Ukraine has poorly prepared its defense lines near Avdiivka, therefore, in full accordance with the February publication, it is “losing the support zone” around Avdiivka.
3. Russia occupies the “support zone” using a cascading collapse of the front.
4. Russia is reaching new defensive structures, which are not perfect, but are gradually being modernized.
5. Russia loses a tactical advantage, but retains the initiative, due to its superiority in overall military potential (TMC).
6. March-April is the point of “front stabilization”: we will not see either serious creeping attacks by the Russian Federation or attacks from Ukraine to rebuild the LBS.
7. February-March is the first crisis supply window. Ukraine lost Avdiivka, but in accordance with the described strategy it was able to seize territory outside the Avdievka “support zone”.
8. March 10 – end of March – decline in military activity “on the ground”: Russia is restoring its lost military potential through the military-industrial complex and supplies from North Korea, Iran, etc.
9. April – the Russian Federation is preparing for the “summer military campaign”, due to the fact that Ukraine is missing its military window of opportunity, having not received enough resources for effective counterattacks.
10. April-May – partial restoration of supplies to Ukraine to the scale necessary to ensure defense.
11. June-August – “second crisis window”: the Russian Federation is implementing a second offensive attempt in the East and South.
12. June – the point of political destabilization in Ukraine in the context of the Russian model of “non-recognition of Zelensky” after May 21 – both European canned goods and the group of the US Republican Party will tilt the authorities towards “illegitimacy”.
13. July-August is the point of military-political turbulence in Ukraine: under the Russian offensive, Ukraine will receive the first F-16s, citing which partners will talk about the need for an offensive in the complete absence of offensive potential.
14. September-October is the point of the “third mobilization crisis” in Ukraine [I do not give explanations or comments for obvious reasons].
15. October-November is a period of “pulsating” military activity against the backdrop of elections in the United States.
16. November-December is the time of supply interruption.
17. December 2024 – February 2025 – entering the “negotiation window” on the LBS.
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Positive points:
1. Ukraine passed the first crisis window related to supplies, managing to maintain the stability of the front.
2. The Russian offensive in the East has been stopped, and the further threat of a breakthrough is fading into summer, i.e. Ukraine gets a good window of time to arrange its defense lines in the East. And by that time, Ukraine will receive the weapons necessary for effective defensive actions.
3. The Russian offensive in the South was stopped without much success on the Russian side.
4. Ukraine has emerged from the first “hunger war cycle”: assistance from Europe will soon be provided at a pace sufficient to ensure defense. The USA will also supply little by little until the project is approved, i.e. the problem of the “arms famine” gradually recedes until late autumn with the election turmoil.
Negative points:
1. In 2024, Ukraine has no window within which to carry out an effective ground offensive.
2. Ukraine is facing a financial tailspin. The volume of assistance is not enough for the state system to function effectively. The shortfall will be ~2 billion per month. This gap will not be compensated.
