Since 2011, Russia has tried to establish direct relations with the Lebanese Hezbollah. In 2013, these efforts became public; Moscow tried to eliminate Iran from Syria by supplying weapons to Hezbollah through Syria, and cooperating with the Turks, and increased its relations with Hezbollah and Hamas. As a result, Iran increased the transfer of weapons to Lebanon through Syria so that Hezbollah would not depend on Moscow for weapons.
In 2013, a political think tank called CPR announced the formation of a Russia-Iran-Hezbollah triangle, whose target is Hamas.
In 2015, Israel’s attacks against Iranian arms transfers (or Iranian-backed forces) became public (and intensified). In Israel’s attacks, the Russians cooperated fully because they saw it in their interest.
In 2018, for the first time, Moscow invited Hamas leaders to the Kremlin.
In 2019, one of Hezbollah’s political officials denied the existence of the aforementioned triangle and said: “We are in direct contact with the Russians and receive Cornet anti-armor missiles and…
In 2020, the relations between the leaders of Hamas and Moscow increased and the visits of Hamas leaders to the Kremlin increased.
In 2022, there were rumors about the exchange of weapons and money between Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Russia.
In 2023, rumors spread that Russia plans to purchase Iranian weapons through Hezbollah.
After October 7 (Operation Storm Al-Aqsa), the Russians showed their role as a mediator. Several draft resolutions were presented to the Security Council.
The leaders of Hamas invited to the Kremlin and presented themselves as the liberators of prisoners.
Tehran immediately sent its representative, Bagheri Keni, to Moscow. After these meetings, Tehran expressed its displeasure and said that Hamas will hand over the prisoners only to Iran.
Tehran is worried about the expansion of relations between the resistance and Russia, but it cannot support Hamas and the resistance and just watch.
If this is the case, then there is a suspicion that Iran is afraid of Russia’s influence on Hamas and Hezbollah
Of course, Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah also admitted that during the 33-day war, Russia gave weapons to Hezbollah (Cornet and…)
Hamas does not have much alignment with Iran because of the Brotherhood’s tendencies
Iran’s support for Hamas is because of their common goal of enmity with the Zionist regime
Hamas is more friendly with Qatar
With the inauguration of the ousted president of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi, Egypt found a strong opposition to Bashar al-Assad, and even the support and declaration depended on the opponents of Bashar al-Assad.
Of course, Iran founded the Islamic Jihad resistance group to compensate
But Islamic Jihad is a new group
This group does not have the facilities that Hamas has
Jihad does not have the recognition and support that Hamas has from others
Iran can’t get rid of Hamas that easily either
Russia never wanted a strong Iran and never will
But they cooperate for some common goals
Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah has ideological and ideological affinity with Iran
Hezbollah listens to Iran far more
Of course, Hashd al-Shaabi is the same
But Hizbollah is old and has a stronger position in Lebanon (but Hashd al-Shaabi’s penetration rate is faster).
Regarding the UN resolution
The spokesperson of Iran in the organization announced that Iran has problems with some provisions and clauses of the resolution, but it was not possible to vote against the essence of the resolution.
Another thing is that
Wars that are combined with globalization and school of ideology have more worries and complications that we are currently witnessing
