The created information vacuum under the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine causes an ambiguous reaction.
Most do abide by the rules of the fog of war, not talking in detail and specifically about anything, but the curious always want to know more, so they fall under enemy information influence in this “deaf information zone”.
In accordance with the “manual” developed by Russia for “information sabotage during the preparation of Ukraine for offensive actions,” the Kremlin will:
- 1. Spread disinformation in the Ukrainian environment – preferably in Ukrainian.
- 2. massively publish unreliable data on the losses of Ukraine, attaching false photographs.
- 3. massively publish false information about the losses of the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the period of preparation for offensive operations.
- 4. massively publish information that undermines the confidence of citizens of Ukraine in the civil and military authorities of Ukraine.
- 5. distribute demoralizing and/or misinforming data through “bot farms” – preferably in pro-Ukrainian sites.
- 6. massively disseminate in a foreign environment (preferably American) information that undermines the confidence of partners in the strategic success of Ukraine.
- 7. publish data that “separate” the inhabitants of Ukraine into linguistic, religious, cultural, etc. soil.
- 8. publish information about the “peace formula” and at the same time “leak” (through agents) Moscow’s peace initiatives to the West, while at the same time explaining that Ukraine “will not achieve the desired success” as part of the offensive.
- 9. to publish in the conservative Western environment information about the possibility of “freezing” the war with a parallel leak of information that the Kremlin is ready to freeze according to the “Chinese model”.
The Kremlin considers the information fog to be a convenient platform, relying on which it is possible to publish any information, being sure that it will “reach” the Ukrainian and international reader who does not find answers to emerging questions in the Ukrainian information field.
Now for the counteroffensive. We do not pay attention to executions, notifications in the Western press, etc. As before, reconnaissance in combat with active penetration into the occupied territories continues. The global counteroffensive has not begun. The intensity of individual sections of the front does not correspond to the “proportion” of the intensity of these same sections of the front during the period of the present offensive.
The number of losses in equipment and personnel on the Ukrainian side is significantly below the level that the strategists from the Armed Forces of Ukraine called the “acceptable level.” The number of losses in equipment and personnel on the Russian side exceeds the level expected before the start of local offensive operations.
It can be noted that the Russians in some directions received a command to start meat assaults in order to prevent the offensive actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Offensive operations (in the global sense) did not begin in any of these areas, but Russia erased the defense potential by erroneously reacting to false intensification of attacks. And he continues to react to false attacks, assuming that each new “mass salvo” is a “fatal beginning.”
