

# STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

## ASSESSMENT – "Great Iranian Nationalist Party" (NIGP / @hezbnigp / حزب ناسیونالیست بزرگ ایران)

**Classification:** OSINT / Analytic Product. **Date of Information:** through 24 June 2026. **Estimative language:** ICD 203 / Sherman Kent probabilistic terms used throughout. Confidence levels stated per judgment.

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### TL;DR

- **NIGP has effectively zero independent open-source footprint.** Exhaustive English- and Persian-language searching – including the Telegram handle @hezbnigp, the Persian name حزب ناسیونالیست بزرگ ایران, the abbreviation NIGP, and the slogan برای ایران – returned no third-party media coverage, no Telegram-directory (TGStat/Telemetr) listing, no Wikipedia entry, no named leadership, and no subscriber data. The entity is best assessed as **small, nascent, and likely single-operator or small-cell** (*confidence: high on the footprint finding; moderate on the size inference*).
- **The party's ideology is an "Islamic-nationalist" synthesis** that fuses pre-Islamic Achaemenid/Faravahar iconography with explicit acceptance of the Islamic Republic flag, "Allah Akbar," and an "anti-America/anti-Israel," anti-MEK, anti-Komala, anti-separatist information posture. **This posture aligns far more closely with Islamic Republic / IRGC wartime strategic**

**messaging than with the diaspora nationalist, monarchist, or Pan-Iranist currents whose symbols it borrows** (*confidence: moderate*).

- **NIGP is most plausibly a product of wartime "rally-around-the-flag" nationalist mobilization** during and after the June 2025 Twelve-Day War and the February–June 2026 Iran war. The competing hypotheses best supported by evidence are **(a) a regime-aligned/astroturfed nationalist channel** and **(b) a genuine but tiny independent nationalist startup**; a diaspora-opposition or foreign-IO origin is judged **unlikely** given the pro-armed-forces, anti-MEK, Islamic-flag-accepting content (*confidence: low-to-moderate; this is an attribution judgment built on content analysis, not on technical/forensic indicators, which were unavailable*).

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## BLUF

The "Great Iranian Nationalist Party" presents itself, through a 53-article charter, branded iconography, and "words from the headquarters" propaganda, as a structured nationalist party with a leader-centric, intelligence-equipped organization. In reality, **its open-source presence is essentially invisible**, which is itself the single most important finding: the gap between the entity's elaborate self-presentation (charter, secretariats, a secret intelligence directorate) and its non-existent public footprint is the central analytic signal. The combination of pre-Islamic civilizational symbolism with explicit endorsement of the Islamic Republic flag and an anti-US/anti-Israel/anti-MEK/anti-separatist line is **ideologically anomalous for genuine diaspora nationalism and consistent with the Islamic Republic's documented post-2025 nationalist pivot**. We assess with moderate confidence that NIGP functions — whether by design or by sympathetic imitation — as a node in the pro-regime, nationalism-coded information environment

that emerged from the 2025–2026 wars, rather than as an opposition or foreign actor. Treadstone 71 should treat NIGP as a **low-currently-observable, potentially-instrumentable influence asset** and monitor it for growth, coordination, and tasking signatures.

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## KEY FINDINGS

1. **Null footprint as primary finding.** A dedicated single-purpose search effort across general web, X/Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Persian outlets, and the Telegram analytics platforms TGStat and Telemetr returned **no verifiable trace** of @hezbnigp, of حزب ناسیونالیست بزرگ ایران, of "Great Iranian Nationalist Party," or of the slogan برای ایران برای ایرانیان. The party is absent from Persian Wikipedia's list of Iranian parties (فهرست حزب‌ها در ایران), from Interior Ministry registered-party rolls, and from all analyst/press coverage. The only token-level near-match ("@OfficialNIGP" on X) is unverified and most likely the unrelated U.S. National Institute of Governmental Purchasing.
2. **Ideologically anomalous hybrid.** NIGP borrows diaspora/secular-nationalist symbolism (Faravahar, Persepolis, Persian-language primacy, social-democratic economics) while professing regime-loyal positions (accepts the IRI flag + Allah Akbar, supports the armed forces, attacks MEK/Komala/separatists). This is the regime's own post-2025 nationalist-pivot signature, not the diaspora's "Iran ≠ Islamic Republic" nationalism.
3. **Wartime emergence.** The propaganda is temporally anchored to the June 2025 Twelve-Day War and/or the February–June 2026 Iran war (bombardment, attacks on power plants/hospitals, medicine sanctions, "thousands of years old, not just forty years").

4. **Charter built for denial and deception.** Article 25's secret intelligence directorate, the leader's unilateral powers, and the coded/uncoded two-tier membership institutionalize compartmentation and source protection – structurally designed to defeat open-source attribution, consistent with the null footprint observed.
  5. **Negligible measurable impact to date** – relevance is as a *specimen* of the 2025–2026 nationalism-laundering phenomenon, not as a discrete high-reach threat.
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## WHO – Attribution & Identity

**The entity as self-described (ground truth from uploaded materials):** A nationalist party with a five-pillar organization – (1) a Leader/Rahbar functioning as the ideological/intellectual organ with sweeping appointment, dismissal, and annulment powers; (2) a 6–16-member Headquarters/Setad oversight body; (3) a Central Council legislature on three-month terms; (4) executive Secretariats/Dabirkhaneh (propaganda, education, culture, recruitment); and (5) tiered "official" (coded) and "unofficial" members. Article 25 establishes a **secret Information/Intelligence Secretary** (دبیر اطلاعات) operating confidentially and directly under the Leader. Activity is "virtual first" then structured (Article 18).

**The entity as found in open sources:** Effectively nothing (see Key Finding 1). The absence from TGStat/Telemetr – platforms that index 2.7M+ channels including obscure ones – indicates the channel is private, brand-new, or below crawler thresholds (i.e., very small).

**Assessment of identity (ACH summary below):** NIGP is most likely either a **regime-aligned/astroturfed nationalist channel** or a **genuine but minuscule independent nationalist startup**. It is **almost certainly not** a Pahlavi-monarchist, Pan-Iranist, National

Front, MEK, or Komala vehicle – it explicitly names MEK/MKO, Komala, and Saddam as "enemy tools," supports the armed forces, and accepts the Islamic Republic flag, all of which are disqualifying for those currents (*confidence: high on the exclusions; moderate on the positive attribution*).

**Timing:** No verifiable founding date exists. The "words from the headquarters" content is temporally consistent with the June 2025 Twelve-Day War and/or the February–June 2026 Iran war, strongly suggesting emergence in the 2025–2026 wartime window (*confidence: moderate*).

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## WHAT – Ideological Placement

NIGP occupies an analytically unusual position. Iranian nationalism historically splits into: secular/civic nationalism (Mosaddegh, National Front, Iran Party); ethno-racial Pan-Iranism (Pan-Iranist Party, founded on Mahmoud Afshar Yazdi's doctrine; led historically by Mohsen Pezeshkpour); fascistic ultranationalism (SUMKA, the 1950s neo-Nazi party of Davud Monshizadeh, whose emblem was a stylized Faravahar); Pahlavi/Constitutionalist monarchism (Reza Pahlavi); and the regime's own "Islamic-Shia nationalism" (ملت-امت / ummah-nation synthesis).

**NIGP borrows symbols from the secular/ethno-nationalist tradition** – the Faravahar-style winged figure, Achaemenid/Persepolis imagery, Persian-language primacy, Iranian-philosophy intellectual foundation, social-democratic economics, nationalization of "mother industries." **Yet it simultaneously accepts the Islamic Republic flag with "Allah Akbar" and the IRI emblem, supports the armed forces, and adopts an anti-America/anti-Israel, anti-MEK, anti-Komala, anti-separatist line.** This is precisely the synthesis the Islamic Republic itself has been performing since mid-2025: leaning into Cyrus, Persepolis,

and patriotic anthems to manufacture wartime unity. [Iran International](#) The clearest emblem of that pivot was the statue of Sassanid emperor Shapur I forcing the Roman emperor Valerian to kneel, **unveiled 7 November 2025 in Tehran's Enghelab (Revolution) Square** under the "You will kneel again" campaign – designed, per Iran International, on Khamenei's own instructions, with Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani tweeting "Enmity toward Greater Iran has no outcome other than eventually kneeling before this historic nation." As historian Arash Azizi observed (Iran International, 17 July 2025): *"The total failure of Khomeinism and Islamism as a sort of transnational ideology has meant that if there's anything to fall back upon, it's a version of nationalism."* The marriage of pre-Islamic imagery with regime loyalism is the signature of the **state's post-war nationalist pivot**, not of the diaspora's "Iran ≠ Islamic Republic" nationalism – captured in slogans such as "Not Gaza, not Lebanon, I only give my life for Iran," which GAMAAN found 64% of Iranians supported (and "Our enemy is right here, they lie that it is America," supported by 73%) when it tested them in 2021. [The Conversation](#)

**Judgment:** NIGP's symbol set is diaspora-coded but its political loyalties are regime-coded. This hybrid is the single strongest indicator that NIGP belongs to the pro-regime nationalist information current rather than the opposition one (*confidence: moderate*).

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## **SO WHAT – Information Operations & Cognitive-Warfare Assessment**

**Narrative architecture.** The "words from the headquarters" text deploys a textbook set of cognitive-warfare techniques:

- **Civilizational continuity / deep-time framing:** "this enmity is thousands of years old, not just forty years" – extends regime-

defense into a multi-millennial Iranian-survival narrative, decoupling loyalty from the (unpopular) 47-year-old Islamic Republic and re-anchoring it in 2,500 years of Iran. This mirrors regime figures' verbatim move (e.g., state-media framing of "47 years" of enmity and Iran's "thousands of years" of survival).

- **Victimhood / siege framing:** bombardment, attacks on power plants, energy, hospitals, medicine sanctions – establishes in-group injury and moral high ground.
- **Reflexive control / in-group policing:** "the enemy's strongest weapon is lies, slander, rumors, sowing discord," wanting "an Iranian to kill another Iranian." This is a classic reflexive-control inoculation move: it pre-frames any internal dissent or fact-checking as enemy action, steering the audience to self-censor and attack critics. It maps directly onto documented IRGC-aligned wartime messaging warning that the enemy seeks "internal divisions, religious/ethnic fault-lines, and manufactured dichotomies between the government and the system."
- **Out-group naming:** MEK/MKO, Komala, Saddam as "enemy tools" – fuses contemporary opposition with the trauma of the Iran–Iraq War.

**STEMPLES Plus read (capabilities dimension):**

- **S(ocial):** Targets nationalist sentiment across ethnic groups; anti-separatism aimed at Kurdish/Baluch/Azeri/Arab fault-lines that the regime fears most.
- **T(echnical):** Telegram-first, "virtual first" by charter. Branding quality (logo, bilingual poster) suggests basic-but-competent graphic-design capability – consistent with a single skilled operator or small media cell, not an industrial troll farm.
- **E(conomic):** Social-democratic platform; nationalization of mother industries; agricultural self-sufficiency – economically populist, resonant with a sanctions-battered public.

- **M(ilitary)**: Explicitly pro-armed-forces/defense-oriented — a regime-aligned tell.
- **P(olitical)**: "National-democracy" (mardom-salari-ye melli) rhetoric; ambiguous flag posture hedges between IRI legitimacy and historical-flag "respect."
- **L(egal/Law)**: Justice/rule-of-law emphasis.
- **E(ducation)**: Dedicated education/culture secretariats — indoctrination infrastructure on paper.
- **S(ecurity)**: Article 25's secret intelligence directorate — see D&D below.
- **Plus (Religion/Demographics)**: Family-centric model rejecting both Eastern collectivism and Western individualism; Persian-language primacy.

**Target audience:** war-weary, nationally proud Iranians — especially the large ambivalent segment that, per GAMAAN's "Iranians' Attitudes Toward the 12-Day War" survey (24–28 September 2025, 30,372 respondents), experienced the conflict as *not their own*: **63% said the war was "between Israel and the Islamic Republic, not the Iranian people,"** [Gamaan](#) and only 33% viewed it as a national-patriotic war (52% rejected that framing). [Gamaan](#) NIGP's content is engineered to capture that ambivalent middle and steer it toward regime-compatible unity rather than regime change.

**Comparison to known IO tradecraft.** NIGP's reflexive-control "Iranian-kills-Iranian" framing, deep-time victimhood, and out-group naming are consistent with the IRGC/MOIS-linked Persian Telegram ecosystem documented by FDD (Microsoft MTAC-sourced), SecurityScorecard, SOCRadar, Factnameh, and ISD during both wars, and with Treadstone 71's own characterization of Iranian cognitive warfare (Basij auxiliaries, clerical media, impostor personas) measured against STEMPLES Plus.

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## DENIAL & DECEPTION ANALYSIS (Charter Article 25)

The charter's most operationally significant feature is the **secret Information/Intelligence Secretary** whose directorate operates confidentially and directly under the Leader, combined with the **two-tier (coded "official" vs. "unofficial") membership** and the Leader's unilateral power to annul resolutions and appoint/dismiss the deputy and headquarters staff.

These provisions institutionalize **compartmentation, deniability, and source protection** – the defining features of a security/intelligence apparatus, not a normal political party. Two readings:

1. **Aspirational mimicry:** a small actor copying the leader-centric, security-conscious architecture of the Islamic Republic itself (velayat-e faqih's rahbar with sweeping appointment powers and override rights) and of historical cadre parties (Tudeh, Hezb-e Jomhuri-ye Eslami), lending itself gravitas it does not operationally possess.
2. **Functional tradecraft:** a deliberate structure to obscure membership, funding, and direction – expected of an astroturfed or state-linked entity seeking to mask attribution.

Either way, the charter is **structurally designed to defeat open-source attribution**, which is fully consistent with the null footprint we observe. The secrecy is a feature, not an accident (*confidence: moderate*).

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## WHY NOW – The War Context

The temporal anchor is well-established:

- **June 2025 "Twelve-Day War":** Israel's 13 June strikes on Iranian nuclear/military/infrastructure targets; US strikes (Operation Midnight Hammer) on 22 June – per Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine, **7 B-2 Spirit bombers and 125+ aircraft dropped 14 GBU-57 MOP bunker-busters on Fordow/Natanz while a submarine fired ~30 Tomahawks at Isfahan (~75 precision weapons over 25 minutes)** [Congress.gov](#) – and a 24 June ceasefire. The opening Israeli strikes killed senior commanders (Salami, Bagheri) and nuclear scientists.
- **February–June 2026 Iran war:** US–Israeli strikes from 28 February 2026; per Factnameh, the **28 February strikes reportedly killed Khamenei at the Beit-e-Rahbari compound;** [Substack](#) the rial collapsed; new international sanctions landed in September 2025; and the December 2025–2026 protests followed.
- **The regime's documented "nationalist pivot":** FPRI explicitly identifies a post-war "nationalist pivot" and institutional restructuring; Iran International, INSS, and historian Arash Azizi document Tehran "embracing the very nationalism it suppressed." [Iran International](#)
- **A live information-operations battlespace:** The academic study "Repression through anti-repression tools: an analysis of the coordinated campaign of Iranian Telegram channels at times of crisis," *Journal of Information Technology & Politics* (Taylor & Francis, 2026), analyzed 47,567 posts across 29 channels covering 13–24 June 2025 and found that "**proxy and entertainment channels formed an amplification layer that... repeatedly reproduced regime-aligned narratives.**" [Taylor & Francis Online](#) Factnameh's forensic analysis of the February 2026 war's first 72 hours found **50,591 posts** [Substack](#) **across pro-state channels with 65.1% showing >95% word-similarity, indicating "a state-orchestrated narrative."** [Substack](#) FDD/Microsoft MTAC, SecurityScorecard, and SOCRadar

document the dense IRGC/MOIS-linked Telegram network (Sepah, SaberIn, Bisimchi Media, etc.) that surged during both wars.

NIGP's content sits squarely inside this milieu. Its emergence is best explained as **wartime nationalist mobilization** – whether organic, sympathetic, or directed (*confidence: moderate*).

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## FUNDING & CAPABILITIES

**Open-source footprint on funding: nil.** No financial backing, donations infrastructure, real-world events, membership figures, or organizational addresses are discoverable.

**Realistic capability assessment:**

- **Scale:** Almost certainly small/nascent – likely single-operator or small-cell. Absence from TGStat/Telemetr indicates a private, brand-new, or sub-threshold (very small) channel (*confidence: moderate*).
  - **Production:** Competent-but-not-industrial graphic design (logo; bilingual "For Iran, For Iranians" poster with Persepolis/Milad Tower iconography). Consistent with one skilled volunteer/operator.
  - **Organizational reality:** The 53-article charter describes an organization far larger and more sophisticated than any evidence supports. This is a **paper organization** – the documents likely outstrip the human reality by an order of magnitude (*confidence: moderate*).
  - **Operational capability:** Currently low-observable. No evidence of real-world mobilization, coordinated amplification, or measurable reach.
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## IMPACTS SO FAR

**Negligible and unmeasurable in open sources.** There is no evidence NIGP has achieved meaningful reach, influenced discourse, been cited by other channels, or conducted offline activity. Its impact-to-date is best characterized as **below the detection threshold** – in sharp contrast to the documented, high-volume IRGC-linked channels that genuinely shape the wartime Telegram environment.

The relevance of NIGP is therefore **not its current effect but what it represents**: a template/instance of the nationalism-coded, regime-compatible messaging that proliferated in 2025–2026, and a possible seed that could be cultivated, amplified, or networked.

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## ANALYSIS OF COMPETING HYPOTHESES (Attribution / Sponsorship)

Hypothesis	Supporting evidence	Contradicting evidence	A
<b>H1: Regime-aligned / IRGC- or MOIS-astroturfed nationalist asset to channel nationalist sentiment toward</b>	Anti-US/Israel/MEK/Komala/separatist line; pro-armed-forces; accepts IRI flag + Allah Akbar; reflexive-control "Iranian-kills-Iranian" framing identical to IRGC channels; charter secrecy/compartimentation; emergence in wartime nationalist-pivot window	No technical/forensic linkage available; could be sympathetic imitation rather than direction	<b>M n c</b>

Hypothesis	Supporting evidence	Contradicting evidence	A
regime survival			
<b>H2: Genuine but tiny independent nationalist startup riding wartime sentiment</b>	Idiosyncratic ideological blend; amateurish footprint; social-democratic platform unusual for state IO	Hard to distinguish from H1 by content alone; pro-regime tells are strong	<b>P k n</b>
<b>H3: Diaspora opposition group</b>	Borrows diaspora nationalist symbols (Faravahar, Persepolis)	Decisively contradicted: supports armed forces, accepts IRI flag, attacks MEK/Komala – diaspora nationalism does the opposite	<b>U</b>
<b>H4: Foreign (non-Iranian) influence operation</b>	Telegram-first, anonymized	No linguistic, thematic, or targeting evidence; content is intensely Iran-internal and pro-defense	<b>V u</b>

**Key discriminator:** the simultaneous embrace of pre-Islamic symbolism *and* the Islamic Republic flag/armed forces. This combination is the regime's own post-2025 move and is anathema

to the diaspora. It is the strongest available evidence and points to H1/H2.

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## KEY ASSUMPTIONS CHECK

- *Assumption:* The uploaded materials authentically represent the entity. *If false* (hoax, honeypot, third-party fabrication), attribution shifts substantially. *Mitigation:* treat materials as self-presentation; corroborate via future technical collection.
  - *Assumption:* Absence from TGStat/Telemetr ≈ very small/new. *Caveat:* a private or recently-created channel can produce identical null results without being trivial; do not over-read size.
  - *Assumption:* Content posture reliably indicates sponsorship. *Caveat:* content analysis cannot substitute for forensic/infrastructure attribution; H1 vs. H2 cannot be resolved without technical collection.
  - *Assumption:* Emergence is wartime-driven. *Caveat:* the charter could predate the war; only the propaganda is clearly war-anchored.
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## OUTLOOK – Strategic Foresight (Cone of Plausibility, 12–24 months)

**Baseline (most likely):** NIGP remains a small, low-reach node in the crowded pro-regime/nationalism-coded Telegram space. It persists episodically, spiking during escalation cycles, never achieving independent significance – one of many interchangeable wartime nationalist micro-channels (*confidence: moderate*).

**Best case (for the entity / worst for analysts):** NIGP is cultivated or networked – gains amplification from larger IRGC-linked hubs, builds a coded membership, and matures into a genuine astroturf

brand lending "grassroots nationalist" cover to regime-survival messaging, exploiting the war-weary patriotic middle. Its charter's secretariat/intelligence architecture becomes partially operational (*confidence: low*).

**Worst case (low probability, high impact):** In a regime-collapse or fragmentation scenario, an entity like NIGP – pre-positioned with leader-centric, intelligence-equipped structure and cross-ethnic nationalist branding – could attempt to reconstitute as a security-flavored nationalist movement competing in a post-IRI vacuum, or serve as a continuity vehicle for displaced security personnel. Speculative, but the charter is unusually well-suited to clandestine persistence (*confidence: low*).

**Indicators to watch (would shift judgments):**

- Sudden subscriber growth or appearance in TGStat/Telemetr → upgrade from "negligible."
- Cross-posting/coordination with known IRGC-linked channels (Sepah, SaberIn, Bisimchi Media) → strengthens H1.
- Any named leadership, funding solicitation, or real-world event → shifts toward genuine-organization readings.
- Multilingual expansion or targeting of Israeli/Western audiences → reweights toward state-IO.
- Adoption of the secret-intelligence-secretary function in observable behavior (doxxing, dissent-policing) → confirms security-apparatus intent.

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## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Immediate (collection):** Establish persistent Telegram-native monitoring of @hezbniqp (the channel evaded directory indexing; direct observation is required). Capture creation date, admin metadata, forwarding/citation graph, posting cadence,

and linked channels/bots. **Threshold:** a jump above directory-indexing thresholds reclassifies the entity from "negligible" to "emerging."

2. **Near-term (attribution):** Pursue technical/forensic indicators unavailable to OSINT – infrastructure, cross-posting timing, image EXIF/metadata, and stylometric comparison against known IRGC/MOIS-linked Persian channels – to resolve H1 vs. H2. Until then, hold attribution at "regime-aligned posture, sponsorship unproven."
3. **Near-term (network mapping):** Map NIGP against the documented 2025–2026 pro-regime Telegram coordination network (per the *Journal of Information Technology & Politics* study, Factnameh, and FDD). Co-posting ties to known IRGC hubs would be decisive.
4. **Analytic hygiene:** Treat the charter as **self-presentation/aspiration**, not confirmed capability. Explicitly flag the D&D risk: the secrecy provisions are designed to defeat the very attribution effort being conducted.
5. **Strategic framing for stakeholders:** Position NIGP not as a discrete threat but as a **specimen** of the wartime nationalism-launders phenomenon. The actionable intelligence is the *pattern*, not this single low-reach channel.
6. **Thresholds that change the recommendation:** (a) verified IRGC/MOIS linkage → escalate to active counter-IO tracking; (b) demonstrated reach/coordination → prioritize for narrative-countermeasure planning; (c) confirmed independent/diaspora origin → de-prioritize as a regime asset and reassess.

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## CAVEATS

- **This is an OSINT assessment built largely on content analysis of user-provided materials plus the surrounding 2025–2026**

**information environment.** No technical, forensic, or human-source attribution was available; H1 vs. H2 is therefore unresolved.

- **The null footprint is a finding, not a failure** – but absence of evidence is not evidence of absence; a private or brand-new channel can be invisible to OSINT yet operationally real.
- **Several contextual facts (2026 Iran war specifics, the reported death of Khamenei, casualty figures) derive from rapidly evolving reporting** and should be treated as provisional.
- **The competing-hypotheses table is content-driven;** a single piece of forensic linkage could overturn the ordering.
- **Estimative confidence levels reflect analytic judgment under significant collection gaps,** consistent with ICD 203.