



Intelligence Assessment of the WANA Article on IRGC Battlefield “Surprises”

Executive Summary

We reviewed the news article “IRGC: Prepared to Unleash ‘Surprises Beyond Enemy Calculation’ on the Battlefield.” It is best understood as an English-language amplification of a Persian-language anniversary statement issued in the name of the IRGC on 2 Ordibehesht 1405 / April 22, 2026. A near-verbatim Persian text appeared in Tasnim News Agency[1] at 08:59 local time and in the same-day Persian republications that named the IRGC source chain. Matching English renderings then appeared within hours in Mehr News Agency[2], Al-Manar[3], and ANA. Search-index evidence confirms the WANA page existed on April 22, 2026, and used the same core framing, including the phrase “Strategic Deadlock and ‘Cognitive Void.’” [4]

Best-supported content in the article is not the claim of a novel super-weapon. Stronger evidence points to a signaling package built around capabilities that Iranian outlets had already publicized across 2025: underground missile and naval facilities, anti-ship cruise missile storage, naval mining concepts, drone-missile integration, loitering munitions, and air-defense additions shown during the Great Prophet 19 exercise cycle. Such material gives the IRGC a factual basis for claiming it still holds “new cards,” but none of the accessible evidence supports an undisclosed breakthrough system. [5]

Least-supported content sits in the statement’s claimed battlefield effects: the “100 coordinated waves” of “Operation True Promise 4,” the asserted “cognitive void,” and the claim that the enemy pleaded for a ceasefire. Accessible open sources confirm that Iranian and aligned media outlets repeated the language widely. Independent sources do not verify the full wave count, the claimed scale of damage, or the causal story that Iranian strikes alone led to an adversary's ceasefire decision. Confidence is therefore high on the publication chain, moderate on the existence of residual IRGC strike capacity and reserved stockpiles, and low on the statement’s battle-damage and coercive-effect claims. [6]

A broader intelligence picture adds an important constraint. Independent U.S. intelligence and defense-facing sources say Iran still poses missile and cyber threats, maintains underground stockpiles, and retains capacity for disruptive retaliation. The same record also says Iran and aligned actors have been degraded, and that Tehran struggled in some recent periods to defend against Israeli cyber activity and answer in kind. Such evidence supports a balanced judgment: the article reflects real residual capability, but the rhetoric outruns the verified record. [7]




Source and publication assessment

Highest-confidence finding: the actual statement is dated 2 Ordibehesht 1405 / April 22, 2026, and signed “Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.” Core Persian threat language says the force stands at peak readiness, promises “crushing blows” against remaining enemy assets in the region, and says the IRGC and Basij are ready to reveal “new cards on the battlefield.” English outlets repeated the same message with a light variation. [2]

Most important new analytic point: WANA added editorial section heads — “Strategic Deadlock and ‘Cognitive Void,’” “The ‘Media Empire’ and Psychological Warfare,” and “A New Regional Order” — that do not appear in the official Persian statement. WANA also trimmed long domestic-legitimation passages, public-support language, and the closing leadership formula, while preserving deterrence, strike-effect claims, and regional-order claims for foreign readers outside Iran[3] and focused mainly on threats toward the United States[4] and Israel[5]. Such editing aligns with WANA’s declared mission to address foreign audiences with an Iranian narrative.

Two short quotations capture the chain clearly. Tasnim uses “کارت‌های جدید در میدان نبرد” and “خلاً شناختی”; later English outlets render the same ideas as “new capabilities on the battlefield” or “new cards on the battlefield,” and “cognitive void.” Phrase drift is minor. Meaning remains stable across the chain. Such stability raises confidence that WANA translated or condensed an already circulating Persian source rather than that it uncovered a fresh claim. [9]

Authorship for the WANA page remains unverified. Search-index hits associate the article with more than one WANA author archive, including pages tied to “Zahra Rezayi” and “site manager.” A separate author archive linked the March 11 article “Iran Has Not Yet Unveiled Its New Defensive Capabilities” to “hejazi.” Such conflict prevents a clean byline assessment. Publication date for the WANA item is clear from search indexing: April 22, 2026. The source language is Persian. WANA article language is English. Edit history for the WANA page was not recoverable from accessible open indexing. [10]



Chain reconstruction above rests on same-day timestamps, continuity of wording, and source overlap, not on a direct parse of the WANA page body. Confidence in the chain is high despite



that collection gap. Confidence in any claim about missing outbound links from the WANA page is low because the full page did not yield a retrievable link map in the current collection environment. [11]

The Actual IRGC Statement

Multiple Persian republications preserve the statement nearly verbatim and tie it back to the official IRGC information portal or Sepah News. The wording across the Persian copies remains stable enough to support a high-confidence reconstruction of the official text. English translations published later the same day match the main clauses, though each outlet shortens and smooths the language in slightly different ways. [7]

Field	Recovered detail
Root source attribution	Persian relays attribute the text to Sepah News[8] or to the official IRGC information portal. [9]
Corporate author	“Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” with no named individual spokesperson in the recovered text. [10]
Date	2 Ordibehesht 1405 / April 22, 2026. [10]
Main Persian title	“سپاه مہیای خلق دستاوردها و شگفتانہ‌ہای بزرگتر از دایرہ فہم و محاسبہ دشمن است” [11]
Main threat line	IRGC says it is at “peak readiness” and will strike “crushing blows” beyond enemy imagination against remaining regional assets. [12]
Operational claim	The statement says the “100-wave” combined missile-drone campaign created a “cognitive void” and drove enemy miscalculation and ceasefire pleading. [13]
Closing political formula	The statement ends with a broader victory claim and a regional-order claim; the closing leadership language names Mojtaba Khamenei[14] in the commander-in-chief formula. Report notes source wording only. [10]

Short verbatim fragments from the recovered Persian text anchor the match between the official statement and English repeats:



Persian fragment	Tight English rendering	Why it matters
“کارت‌های جدید در میدان نبرد”	“new cards on the battlefield”	The same phrase sits at the center of the WANA, Press TV, and Mehr renderings. [15]
“خلا شناختی”	“cognitive void”	Phrase appears in the Persian text and reappears in WANA snippets and English outlet summaries. [16]
“ضربات خردکننده و فراتر از تصور دشمن”	“crushing blows beyond enemy imagination”	Core deterrent line recovered in Persian and in English translations. [17]

One detail deserves special notice. The Persian statement includes a long domestic-legitimation arc: a 48-year institutional history, praise for public street support for more than 50 days, attacks on the “media empire” of the enemy, and a closing declaration that Iran won the recent imposed war. WANA did not reproduce the full domestic framing; WANA selected the deterrence and regional-order core for foreign readers. [18]

The Actual WANA Article

Search-index recovery now yields enough material to reconstruct the WANA page with high confidence, even though the live URL remains blocked in the present environment. Metadata shows the exact title **IRGC: Prepared to Unleash “Surprises Beyond Enemy Calculation” on the Battlefield**, the category **Foreign Policy / WANA News**, and the timestamp **April 22, 2026, 11:02 AM**. The opening snippet of the language says the IRGC marked its founding anniversary with a threat to deliver “crushing blows” beyond enemy calculation. [19]

Recovered WANA element	Evidence
Exact title	“IRGC: Prepared to Unleash ‘Surprises Beyond Enemy Calculation’ on the Battlefield.” [20]
Timestamp	“April 22 2026, 11:02 AM.” [20]
Category	“Foreign Policy WANA News.” [20]
Opening frame	WANA says the IRGC issued a “strategic statement” on its founding anniversary and threatened “crushing blows” beyond enemy calculation. [21]



Recovered WANA element	Evidence
Section head	“Strategic Deadlock and ‘Cognitive Void.’” [22]
Operational summary	WANA says the recent “100-wave combined missile and drone operation” targeted “strategic centers and logistics infrastructures,” creating a “cognitive void.” [23]
Section head	“The ‘Media Empire’ and Psychological Warfare.” [24]
Psychological-warfare summary	WANA says propaganda attacks against the IRGC stem from IRGC success in “cognitive warfare” and from its role as the “toughest obstacle” to anti-Iranian strategies. [25]
Section head	“A New Regional Order.” [26]
Regional-order summary	WANA says the order ahead rests on the absence of “arrogant foreign powers,” especially America, and on a “stable and secure environment.” [26]
Byline status	Search indexes place the article under conflicting author archives: one for “Zahra Rezayi,” another for “site manager.” A named byline on the live page remains unresolved. [27]

WANA’s reconstructed body shows a foreign-audience rewrite rather than a straight translation. Official Persian text moves through institutional history, public support, enemy media pressure, 100-wave strike claims, readiness warnings, and a closing political-religious formula. WANA repackages the same material into clean thematic blocks that read like an analytic explainer. Such editorial structure fits the outlet’s stated mission: WANA says it “strives to provide foreign audiences with news from Iran with a novel view and narrative.” [28]

Claim testing and evidence chain

Claim in the article/source chain	Best corroborating evidence	Assessment
IRGC is ready to use “new cards” and produce battlefield surprises beyond enemy calculations.	Tasnim’s Persian text states readiness to use “new cards on the battlefield.” The same claim appears within hours in Mehr, ANA, and Al-Manar. Iranian outlets had already publicized underground missile facilities, anti-ship cruise missile cities, and new drone-missile pairings through 2025. [12]	Moderate confidence. The claim aligns with a documented Iranian pattern of withholding details and revealing selected systems. Open evidence supports reserved capacity, not a



Claim in the article/source chain	Best corroborating evidence	Assessment
		proven, undisclosed wonder-weapon.
“Operation True Promise 4” involved 100 coordinated waves of combined missile and drone strikes.	Iranian English outlets repeat the figure. Tasnim’s Persian text describes a “100-wave” integrated missile-drone operation. Accessible independent material confirms large Iranian salvos in earlier periods, but not the full 100-wave figure for the April 2026 cycle. [13]	Low confidence in the exact wave count. Moderate confidence that Iran conducted repeated multi-wave missile-drone operations in the recent conflict environment.
Iranian strikes created a “cognitive void” and forced enemy miscalculation and ceasefire pleading.	Phrase appears in Tasnim and English reprints. Accessible neutral sources do not verify that claimed effect. Independent analysis, by contrast, describes a degraded but still active Iranian launch capacity and a bargaining logic around limited retaliation. [14]	Low confidence. The phrase fits propaganda and psychological signaling more than a verified battle assessment.
IRGC remains at peak readiness for immediate, decisive follow-on action.	Iranian reporting throughout 2025 showed repeated drills, missile-city reveals, and new naval and drone systems. U.S. intelligence reporting also says Iran still poses missile and cyber threats, yet adds that Tehran and aligned actors were degraded and at times struggled to respond in kind. [15]	Moderate confidence in residual readiness and retaliatory capacity. Low confidence in “peak” readiness if read literally.
Iran retains meaningful cyber options tied to broader military signaling.	ODNI says Iran poses a cyber threat to U.S. networks and critical infrastructure. FBI/CISA/NSA/EPA/DOE/CNMF advisory from April 7, 2026, documents Iranian-affiliated exploitation of PLCs across U.S. critical infrastructure and ties earlier similar activity to an IRGC-linked entity. CSIS also judges cyber retaliation highly likely in a U.S.-Iran strike scenario. [16]	High confidence. Cyber disruption is one of the strongest independently supported parts of the broader IRGC threat picture.

A simple bottom line follows from the table. Iranian media have solid evidence for capacity signaling but weak evidence for battlefield-effect claims. Such a split is common in coercive messaging: hardware, drills, and survivable stockpiles are easier to verify than claimed enemy paralysis or political submission. [17]

Capability context behind the rhetoric

Publicly revealed Iranian capability developments during 2025 are part of the statement’s message. Iranian outlets reported plans to unveil new underground missile and naval “cities” along the Strait of Hormuz[18] approaches and the Persian Gulf[19] coast in January 2025. A few days later, Iranian state media showed a new subterranean missile facility holding Emad, Qadr, and Qiam missiles and said most of the complex was still not shown. Later reporting described an underground IRGC Navy anti-ship cruise missile city in southern Iran and another large subterranean missile complex unveiled in March 2025. Such disclosures support a



judgment that the IRGC wants adversaries to believe it still holds dispersed, hardened strike inventory. [20]

Iranian drill reporting adds another layer. During Great Prophet 19 naval drills, Iranian outlets reported that IRGC Navy drones launched Qaem and Almas precision-guided missiles with artificial-intelligence features; the drills also featured the first launch of Navvab air-defense missiles from the Shahid Soleimani vessel, cruise and ballistic missile firing, new mining tactics, and anti-air/anti-ship missile activity. An Iranian defense outlet also reported high-speed, missile-capable patrol craft, mines fired from shore launchers, and a smart submarine-launched torpedo whose range and mission were withheld. Separate reporting tied Great Prophet 19 ground-force drills to the Rezvan loitering munition, Qaem-118 air-defense missile unveiling, and wider missile-unit deployment. [21]


Independent sources qualify the scale of the threat. The Center for Strategic and International Studies[22] says Iran still has the Middle East's largest and most diverse missile arsenal, with thousands of ballistic and cruise missiles, and notes that Tehran preserves large stockpiles in secure underground caves. A February 2026 CSIS analysis estimated that Iran fired about 550 ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 one-way attack drones during the June 2025 12-day war, while still treating caves and dispersed launch sites as a planning assumption for future operations. Such findings do not prove the April 2026 IRGC narrative in full, but they do make "surprises" rooted in scale, dispersal, and salvo management credible. [23]

U.S. intelligence reporting tempers that picture. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence[24] 2026 Annual Threat Assessment says Iran and Iranian-aligned actors remain capable of asymmetric attacks, says Iran's cyber operators still threaten U.S. networks and critical infrastructure, and notes that Iran had the technological basis to move toward a military-viable ICBM by 2035 if Tehran chose to do so. The same assessment also says Iran and aligned terrorist actors had been severely degraded and that Tehran struggled during the 2025 war to defend itself against Israeli cyber attacks and to answer in kind. Net assessment: Iran still holds dangerous retaliatory tools, but the article's tone masks attrition and adaptation pressure. [25]

Cyber evidence is stronger than the article implies. The joint April 7, 2026, FBI/CISA/NSA/EPA/DOE/CNMF advisory states that Iranian-affiliated APT actors exploited internet-exposed PLCs across U.S. critical infrastructure, causing disruptions and financial loss, and links earlier similar activity to CyberAv3ngers, an actor affiliated with the IRGC Cyber Electronic Command. A June 30, 2025, FBI-linked advisory also warned that Iranian-affiliated actors could target vulnerable U.S. networks and entities of interest. Such evidence supports a high-confidence finding that Iranian coercion is not only missile-centric. Cyber disruption falls within the real threat envelope. [26]



Timeline and monitoring indicators



Open-source timeline supports a pattern of progressive conditioning. Iranian channels spent months building a narrative that hidden inventory, new launch concepts, and reserve capabilities still exist. April 22, 2026, then packaged the full message into a single anniversary statement. [27]

Date	Event	Why it matters
April 13, 2024	U.S. defense reporting said Iran launched more than 300 airborne weapons at Israel. [28]	Shows prior willingness to use mixed salvos for saturation and signaling.
October 1, 2024	Iranian outlets tied a roughly 200-missile attack to True Promise II. [29]	Helps explain later Iranian reliance on “True Promise” branding as a deterrence narrative.
January 6, 2025	IRGC spokesman Ali Mohammad Naeini[30] announced two new underground missiles and floating cities during Great Prophet 19. [31]	Demonstrates deliberate pre-crisis signaling of hidden inventory and readiness.
January 11, 2025	Iranian state media showed a new subterranean missile facility; Commander Hossein Salami[32] said missile growth continued. [29]	Gives tangible support to the “new cards” theme.
January 26, 2025	IRGC Navy chief Alireza Tangsiri[33] described AI-enabled drone-launched Qaem and Almas missile launches during naval drills. [34]	Suggests the surprise narrative rests partly on integration and tactics rather than on a single new missile.
March 11, 2026	Ali Fadavi[35] said Iran had not yet unveiled new defensive capabilities. [36]	Strong rhetorical precursor to the April 22 statement.
April 22, 2026	Persian IRGC statement, English translations, and WANA index entry appear. [37]	Marks coordinated information dissemination across Persian and English channels.

A monitoring framework should center on observable indicators, not slogans. Highest-value indicators are: fresh unveilings of hardened storage sites; imagery of missile handling inside tunnels; new IRGC Navy mining or anti-ship drill footage; repeated official use of “new cards” language by senior figures; renewed mention of unrevealed capabilities by Fadavi, Salami, or naval spokesmen; expansion of IRGC-linked PLC or OT cyber activity; and a synchronized multilingual push across Persian, English, and Telegram channels that recycles identical



phrasing within hours. Such indicators would show that rhetoric is moving toward operational preparation rather than remaining at the propaganda layer. [38]

Source prioritization, confidence, and limitations

Priority	Source	Source class	Value for analysis
Highest	Sepah News statement as cited by Persian republications	Claimed IRGC-origin source	Canonical root of the message. Direct page retrieval was not available, but Tasnim and KhabarOnline explicitly attribute the text to the IRGC/"Sepah News" chain. [39]
Highest	Tasnim Persian statement	Same-day Persian republication	Best retrievable Persian text with exact language, timestamp, and wording continuity. [40]
High	KhabarOnline, Fararu, ILNA Persian republications	Same-day Persian amplifiers	Useful for cross-checking the stability of wording and the spread of publications within Iran's media ecosystem. [41]
High	Press TV and Defa Press exercise/base reporting	Iranian state and defense-media context	Best open evidence for hardened storage, drills, drone-missile integration, and naval concepts that give substance to the "new cards" message. [42]
Medium	Mehr, ANA, Al-Manar English items	English translation layer	Useful for translation comparison and foreign-audience messaging. Less useful for original sourcing. [43]
Medium	CSIS, ODNI, FBI/CISA	Independent and official non-Iranian checks	Best corrective layer for force size, cave basing, cyber threat, degradation, and analytic balance. [44]
Lower	Telegram reposts	Rapid-distribution channel	Good for tracing amplification speed and slogan discipline, weak for original sourcing. [45]

The source sequencing below reflects site-displayed timestamps and attribution fields recovered during the current run. Some sites omit timezone labels, so minute-by-minute ordering should be read with normal caution. [29]

Time shown on the site	Outlet	Role in the chain
07:38 AM	Press TV[30]	Early English rendering of the statement with direct use of "new cards on the battlefield" and "cognitive vacuum." [31]
09:02	Donyaye Eqtesad[32]	Persian full-text relay that explicitly cites Sepah News. [33]
09:34 AM	Mehr News Agency[34]	English condensation with the 100-wave and "cognitive void" claims intact. [35]
10:51	Tasnim News Agency[36]	English version that preserves core readiness and retaliation language while trimming the longer political close. [37]



Time shown on the site	Outlet	Role in the chain
11:02 AM	WANA	English summary with editorial subheads and foreign-reader packaging. [38]
01:18 PM	IRNA[39]	Later English wire version with close fidelity to the Persian text. [40]

One outside-media reference helps bound the sourcing. A live blog in The Guardian[41] reported the warning as a statement “carried by Tasnim,” which points back to the same Iranian source chain rather than to any separate battlefield evidence set. [42]

Comparison and Confidence

Direct wording comparison shows high confidence in the source chain and in WANA’s basic thematic fidelity, moderate confidence in WANA’s editorial reconstruction, and low confidence in battlefield-effect claims that remain source-bounded within Iranian and aligned media. [43]

Element	Official Persian statement	WANA rendering	Confidence
Founding-anniversary frame	Marks 2 Ordibehesht as the anniversary of the approval of the statute and the formal establishment of the IRGC. [44]	Simplified as the anniversary of the force’s founding. [45]	High
“New cards” language	An explicit phrase appears in the closing readiness line. [10]	Preserved as a central theme. [46]	High
“Cognitive void” claim	Official Persian says the 100-wave campaign created a “cognitive void” and enemy miscalculation. [44]	WANA preserves the phrase and builds a whole section around it. [47]	High on wording match; low on claimed battlefield effect
“Media empire” theme	Official Persian attacks enemy propaganda and says the IRGC’s success in cognitive war angers adversaries. [44]	WANA turns the paragraph into a labeled section: “The ‘Media Empire’ and Psychological Warfare.” [48]	High
Regional-order claim	Official Persian says the region is entering a new order without foreign powers, especially America. [10]	WANA preserves the claim and presents it as a section head. [26]	High
Domestic support passage	Official Persian stresses more than 50 days of public support in the streets. [44]	WANA snippets recovered during the present run do not show that passage. [49]	Moderate
Closing	Official Persian closes with a long	WANA snippets do not show that	Moderate



Element	Official Persian statement	WANA rendering	Confidence
leadership formula	ideological formula and a named leadership line. [10]	close. [26]	
“100-wave” strike effects	The official IRGC text claims infrastructure damage, enemy paralysis, and a ceasefire plea. [44]	WANA repeats the same claim. Outside media recovery in the present run points back to Iranian sourcing rather than separate proof. [50]	Low on independent verification

Bottom-line analytic judgment follows from the comparison table. WANA did not invent the threat. WANA repackaged an already circulating official IRGC statement into a brief for foreign readers, with analytic-style headings and a cleaner narrative arc. Official Persian text remains the main reference point for exact wording, sign-off, and political close. [28]

Open Questions and Limitations

Direct HTML access to the live WANA page remains blocked in the current environment, so a full outbound-link map, server-side metadata pull, and edit-history comparison remain unresolved. Search-engine recovery, however, now fixes the page’s title, time, category, major section heads, and central claims with high confidence. [51]

Named authorship on the WANA page also remains unresolved. Search indexes place the article under conflicting author archives, while accessible older WANA pages often display an agency-style “WANA / WANA News Agency” credit rather than a named reporter. Such mixed practice leaves the exact byline on the April 22 page unsettled. [52]

Battlefield-effect claims inside the statement still sit inside a source-bounded Iranian information chain. Recovered outside-media coverage located during the present run attributed the warning back to Iranian outlets rather than presenting separate strike-forensics or battle-damage evidence. Source recovery, therefore, resolves provenance and wording, yet not the truth of every military-effect claim inside the text. [53]

[1] [2] [39] [41] <https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/2208830/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA>

<https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/2208830/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA>

[3] [17] [29] [42] <https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2025/01/11/740688/IRGC-underground-missile-base-Missile-City-Major-General-Hossein-Salami-Brigadier-General-Amir-Ali-Hajizadeh>

<https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2025/01/11/740688/IRGC-underground-missile-base-Missile-City-Major-General-Hossein-Salami-Brigadier-General-Amir-Ali-Hajizadeh>



[4] [8] [9] [11] [12] [13] [14] [18] [19] [30] [33] [37] [40] [46]

<https://www.tasnimnews.ir/fa/news/1405/02/02/3571957/%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%88-%D8%B4%DA%AF%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%81%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA>

<https://www.tasnimnews.ir/fa/news/1405/02/02/3571957/%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%88-%D8%B4%DA%AF%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%81%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA>

[5] [15] [20] [22] [31] [38] <https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2025/01/06/740421/IRGC-to-unveil-two-new-underground-missile>

<https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2025/01/06/740421/IRGC-to-unveil-two-new-underground-missile>

[6] [43] <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/243874/IRGC-vows-new-surprises-beyond-enemy-s-calculation>

<https://en.mehrnews.com/news/243874/IRGC-vows-new-surprises-beyond-enemy-s-calculation>

[7] [23] [44] <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/iran/>

<https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/iran/>

[10] [32] <https://wanaen.com/author/rezayi/page/329/>

<https://wanaen.com/author/rezayi/page/329/>

[16] [24] [25] <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2026-Unclassified-Report.pdf>

<https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2026-Unclassified-Report.pdf>

[21] [34] <https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2025/01/26/741631/Homegrown-modern-drones-fire-AI-powered-missiles-in-IRGC-naval-drill?ht-comment-id=22433835>

<https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2025/01/26/741631/Homegrown-modern-drones-fire-AI-powered-missiles-in-IRGC-naval-drill?ht-comment-id=22433835>

[26] <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/alerts/2026/iranian-affiliated-cyber-actors-exploit-programmable-logic-controllers-across-us-critical-infrastructure>

<https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/alerts/2026/iranian-affiliated-cyber-actors-exploit-programmable-logic-controllers-across-us-critical-infrastructure>

[27] [28] [35] <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3744218/brown-joint-force-must-continually-drive-change-as-threats-evolve/>

<https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3744218/brown-joint-force-must-continually-drive-change-as-threats-evolve/>

[36] <https://www.mashregnews.ir/news/1793026/%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84-%D8%A2%D8%AA%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%82%D8%A8-%D9%86%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%86%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85-%D9%87%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D8%B2>



<https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/1793026/%D8%A2%D9%85%D8%B1%DB%8C%DA%A9%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84-%D8%A2%D8%AA%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%82%D8%A8-%D9%86%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%86%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85-%D9%87%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D8%B2>

[45] https://t.me/s/sepah_pasdaran?before=195447

https://t.me/s/sepah_pasdaran?before=195447

[47] <https://wanaen.com/irgc-prepared-to-unleash-surprises-beyond-enemy-calculation-on-the-battlefield/>

<https://wanaen.com/irgc-prepared-to-unleash-surprises-beyond-enemy-calculation-on-the-battlefield/>



IRGC signaling path behind the WANA article

