Kings of the Sky!
The Story of the Air Force of Hezbollah

Some of the Hezbollah Air Force

A plethora of information has been published or circulated in narrow circles about Hezbollah's air power. This no longer occupies the enemy's mind. All the information gathered over the past 15 years on this subject was tested in recent months, revealing that what troubles the enemy's leaders—both political and military—is their realization of something previously unacknowledged and denied: It seems that Hezbollah possesses capabilities unknown to the "god of intelligence."

The "god of intelligence," who has "conditioned the consciousness" of forces, groups, and governments for decades and "thwarted their dreams," faced its greatest setback on October 7th, followed by continuous setbacks in Gaza and in the supporting fronts, from Lebanon to Iraq and Yemen.

In Lebanon, the enemy's leaders found themselves confronted with a reality that contradicted all previous assessments. What has emerged so far regarding Hezbollah's capabilities in the realm of "flying objects" was never on the discussion table in "Tel Aviv", and it appears these capabilities were not even within their expectations.

Despite the previous claims that "israel" had detailed knowledge of Iran's efforts in the field of drones and acted on the assumption that Hezbollah had versions of these, the enemy was shocked to discover that superior intelligence gathering, analysis, and assessment is not exclusive to "israel"'s "god of intelligence." How much more so when it becomes clear that the technology in Hezbollah's possession is not of the kind that groups on the fringes of major powers obtain but is fully possessed by Hezbollah with significant investment in it, compelling the enemy to deal with Hezbollah on an equal footing.

Many are unaware of what the enemy has done over the past twenty years in confronting the "accumulation of capabilities" by the resistance in Lebanon. The public, both in "israel" and Lebanon, has not been privy to the unprecedented efforts in intelligence activities by the occupation army and all its security and military apparatuses. Few know about the security, and even military, operations and the daring of "israeli" commando teams, all part of a long-term plan to prevent Hezbollah from acquiring the necessary capabilities and from reaching the stage of activating them.

The bitter truth is that the enemy's estimates were in one place, while Hezbollah and its capabilities stood in an entirely different place. This place was not just outside "israeli" calculations, but also outside their intelligence estimates, perceptions, and hypotheses.

The shock to "israeli" intelligence was so great that, for a period, it led to a denial of reality and a search for alternative explanations until the moment of truth, which awakened the collective consciousness of the entity's inhabitants, with the Haifa incident. This incident and such capabilities were at the lowest rung of "israeli" estimates.

The damage did not stop there. The intelligence blindness regarding the resistance's aerial capabilities revealed another level of concern among enemy leaders. The efforts made in the past two decades focused on finding remedies for what was assumed to be the maximum Hezbollah could achieve. Now, "Tel Aviv" has awakened to discover that what it does not know, or what it did not imagine existed, is not just a margin of error that can be contained but unknown capabilities that cannot be detected until they are used. Among these are capabilities for which there are no present remedies. The fear grows due to what the enemy now considers the potential impact of these capabilities on the course and outcomes of any war: unknown types of drones and unknown types of air defense.

Last May, the National Security Research Center in "Tel Aviv" recommended to the army leadership to "prepare now to find solutions and responses to future threats such as drones guided by systems based on artificial intelligence, which rely on images and scenes they receive in real-time while in the air, to overcome the jamming of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and other types of electronic warfare."

Drones

Once again, the nature of arrogance prevailed in the minds of the enemy's leaders, denying the resistance the ability to operate in this new world. This arrogance leaves the enemy far from answering the obvious question: How can Hezbollah's drones find their way and succeed in striking their targets amid the most extensive electronic, technological, and security clampdown activated on the front? The resistance, which has never stopped working to establish a qualitative presence in this world, has found its way to the sky as well. The enemy has long boasted of being the "god of the sky" or the "king of the sky." However, what the air force of the Islamic resistance has done has enabled its members, intellects, cadres, and leaders to also become "kings of the sky." What has been presented in recent months is merely a small sample of what can be provided in the event of a broader confrontation. The resistance is bound by significant restrictions, allowed to use only a small portion of its energy, ideas, plans, and capabilities, which are the result of decades of effort and paid for with sweat, blood, and tears.

Perhaps the enemy's public does not know that a political and ethical decision stands behind the way Hezbollah's drones currently operate. They have never been launched towards random targets, have never hit a civilian center, nor have they set a forest on fire. However, in the event of a full-scale war, the picture will be entirely different, especially in response to the brutality characteristic of the enemy's behavior. This was the case during the 2006 war when, at the last moment, an enemy warplane managed to shoot down a drone on its way to ammonia tanks. Had it reached its target, "israel" would have understood the true meaning of catastrophe, something it continually inflicts on Palestine and Lebanon.

More importantly, and most sensitively, the enemy is incapable of finding a solution to the operations of the resistance that have so far destroyed a very large number of detection systems and can, at a certain moment, disable air defense systems. This moment would pave the way for types of precise and heavy missiles that know their way to entire neighborhoods in "Tel Aviv" and all the cities of the entity.

In the event of a comprehensive war, the enemy should be prepared for a type of operation unprecedented in its history. Those in the leadership of the resistance assert that the enemy will face a special event, where drones will occupy the skies of the "triangle of death," which links the ""Kiryat Shmona"" bases in the northeast, the "Palmachim" base in the central west, and the "Asaf Ramon" Airport in the south, where the enemy's air force is concentrated.

In this file, Al-Akhbar presents a chapter from the story of the air force in the Islamic Resistance as narrated by a commander in this force. The file exclusively addresses the world of drones in the "air force." The story has its continuation, as the pioneering experience in the air defense system, alongside the missile force, should deter the enemy from continuing its search, as it now knows that these capabilities exist wherever it goes and wherever it turns!

30 Years... From Gliders to Drones, And From Syria to "Karish" to Al-Aqsa Flood

The commander in the air force explains that "in the late 1980s, the first discussions among Hezbollah's military leaders about the air force took place. All the efforts being made to develop the work of resistance groups inside the border strip did not prevent a group from being assigned to explore ways to confront the "king of the sky," who had defeated all the Arabs due to air superiority. This arrogance in the enemy's mind was also linked to its need for the entire region's sky because, after all, the sky over Palestine remains limited for the "israeli" air force. They had developed continuous programs to prevent any competition in the air force realm across the entire Middle East.

In the early 1990s, practical thinking began on establishing the 'air force' within the resistance. This force initially consisted of a group of fighters, with martyr Hassan al-Laqis being one of the most prominent figures in its early stages. He, along with a team, initially trained on gliders with the aim of carrying out martyrdom operations behind enemy lines or against its positions."

In June 1994, Jamil Skaff was martyred during training. After that, work continued on a second aircraft, and we agreed to carry out a new operation. The fighter Hussein Ayoub was chosen, and he was martyred during the operation in 1996. Others were martyred later, and even today, the air force continues to offer martyrs.

Martyr Jamil Skaff

A drone during a military exhibition

Martyr Hussein Ayoub, one of the prominent names of the Air Force

The jihadi commander adds, "From the very first day, Hezbollah knew it was digging a mountain with a needle. Therefore, determination was the hallmark of the work for everyone involved in this endeavor. When we transitioned from gliders to drones, it was due to scientific advancements, and the spirit and readiness of the fighters remained the same. The goal was clear: the enemy cannot be allowed to dominate the sky!

After 2000, everything changed. In Iran, a major workshop on drones began, and we had to benefit from that. We succeeded in creating surprises during the 2006 war, even though some work was still incomplete. Several drone launches occurred, and it was important for us—and troubling for the enemy—that we succeeded in breaching the borders. This indeed happened.

There were groups working under heavy bombardment to prepare attack drones, not just reconnaissance drones like the 'Mirsad' which we started using in 2004. During the war, we launched a drone to Haifa. At that time, the air force accomplished a series of reconnaissance and attack missions."

He continued, "After 2006, we moved to a new phase. The question was how to face new challenges after the enemy began working on producing the 'Iron Dome,' which operates on four layers of defense. When we were able to learn about the enemy's technological capabilities, we compared them to our material capabilities. The differences were immense, which could have led us to stop. But the decision to develop was already made, and there was no room for retreat or cessation."
In discussing the phases of the work, the jihadi commander says: "Between 2006 and 2008, the martyr leader Hassan al-Laqis undertook an exceptional mission to elevate the level of the 'air force.' Martyr Hassan played a significant role in various specialties and was an icon here and among our brothers in Iran. He left his mark in all branches of the forces (naval, air defense, aerospace, missile, and drones)."

Martyr Hassan Al-Laqis

"The martyr Hassan al-Laqis was an icon, and his fingerprints were evident in every development workshop, even in Iran."

In Iran, they attest to Martyr Hassan's contributions and remember his significant role in the development of drones. He always reiterated that this weapon is unique and impactful, and we will rely on it in future wars. Therefore, everyone entrusted him, and his presence in Iran was as influential in the field of drone development as it was in Lebanon.

Martyr Hassan was deeply immersed in the technology of this type of weapon. He was knowledgeable about everything the United States was doing in this field. When he was martyred at the end of 2013, he had nearly completed all the required tasks and more. He trained many who continued his work, and to this day, we operate with weapons that he oversaw the manufacturing of. There has been significant advancement in this field. If the enemy believes that everything Iran has in this domain is available to us, let them think so. However, the truth is that this is not the worst scenario they should consider.

The jihadi commander also discussed the experience of the air force during the war in Syria, revealing that "the drone program was very secretive and entirely closed until the 'air force' participated in the battles in Syria. This began in the famous Battle of Qusayr. The nature of aerial operations cannot be hidden, especially amid immense security and intelligence challenges with the enemy.

The enemy knew we were present at the airports, had our own flight programs, and were activating our frequencies to control the drones we launched. The enemy was closely monitoring us, and knowing this, we operated under the principle that their observation of our participation in the Syrian war was an opportunity for them to learn more about our operations. But we always aimed to turn this opportunity into a threat for the enemy, controlling the extent to which we allowed them to learn about our capabilities.

The enemy monitored everything the 'air force' did. They were interested in knowing our tactics. Many times, when we sent a reconnaissance squadron, the enemy would mobilize their air and intelligence forces to gather information about the launch sites, locations of the human crew, frequencies, and control tools. However, due to their arrogant nature, the enemy behaved as if they knew everything about us. In any case, time will show that what they knew was only what we allowed them to know. The Syrian experience represents a tremendous treasure for Hezbollah's air force. We learned in eight years what would have taken 16 years, and today, we are learning in nine months what would have previously taken over three years."

Al-Nawras drone

He adds: "In Syria, we carried out thousands of sorties, and our reconnaissance operations provided us with hundreds of thousands of aerial images. Although our fight was against the takfiris, our eyes remained on 'israel,' as the confrontation with them cannot be compared to any other battle. During the Syrian war, we had encounters with the enemy. We were just a step away from the Golan Heights. Many things happened during that period. The enemy assumed several times that it had downed our drones or taken control of them, but all of this was part of a plan we had prepared to achieve certain goals. We were able to understand their detection capabilities and the functioning of their radar systems, as well as the ranges of their air defense weapons.

On one occasion, we conducted a test to determine the ranges of the Patriot system that was launched against our drones. The missiles fell in Jordan, while our drones returned safely to their bases. This caused a commotion among the enemy, who questioned why the missiles reached Jordan while they claimed to have intercepted drones over Syria. Our operations in Syria allowed us to learn about the enemy's capabilities in detecting certain types of resistance drones and identifying weaknesses in their radar systems."

The jihadi commander notes that "the air force also participated in the war against ISIS in Iraq. This was an additional opportunity for new experiments, and we compared it with the experiences in Iran and Yemen. However, when the confrontation is with 'israel,' it becomes a different matter because what 'israel' possesses does not exist in other theaters. Specifically, the enemy's intelligence-gathering capabilities are immense and cover very wide areas. They are forced to adopt a special method of working with us.

For example, regarding radars and coverage areas, typically there are hundreds of kilometers between radars. In large countries, there are only 10 to 15 radars. But the enemy installs a radar every 30 km along the border with us. They distribute multiple layers of air defense far beyond what any other country does."

"Israeli" radar for detecting drones

A drone possessed by Hezbollah

The jihadi commander pointed out that this type of intelligence deployment by the enemy "forced us to adopt a different method of operation. More importantly, it provided two things: First, it required adapting the drone weapon to be capable of overcoming the enemy's systems. Often, the enemy would shoot down drones and boast about their actions, even though these were tests and reconnaissance of their operational mechanisms. Many times, our drones would enter and return successfully. We made adjustments to the drones to address the ever-evolving 'israeli' threats. When we say 'we,' we mean all the axis forces, not just Hezbollah, noting that we have become significant producers of this type of weapon in very large quantities."

The jihadi commander adds, "In July 2022, we carried out the mission known as 'Operation Karish,' which threatened the 'israeli' gas field at sea. Following the statement by His Eminence the Secretary General, the enemy made significant preparations in the maritime domain. Even though we lost the element of surprise, we launched three drones with varying missions, including diversionary and reconnaissance tasks.

The enemy boasted that it had succeeded in shooting down the drones. However, the message reached the relevant experts. They knew that we had drones capable of penetrating despite the extensive air and sea coverage. If people heard a drone, it doesn't mean they knew how many drones there were or how deep they were operating. There were four or five squadrons of warplanes and helicopters in the air, yet the drone reached above the Karish field. This means the message was delivered. The enemy shot down two drones, and the third fell on its return journey. The enemy understands the significance of what happened, both in terms of the operational area and the nature of the open, flat region. This forced them to make concessions in the negotiations."

Regarding the period following "Operation Al-Aqsa Flood," the jihadi commander notes, "We faced the most challenging scenario that the Hezbollah air force could have anticipated, as all plans were not based on the assumption that our operations would be confined to the periphery. Nevertheless, we began reconnaissance missions and then execution.

This presented a significant challenge because we are constrained by many limitations. If we were in a full-scale war without restrictions, our operational capabilities would be vastly different. The enemy knows that in a comprehensive war, it will not be able to focus solely on drone warfare but will face a new challenge, with thousands of rockets falling daily on all its military and vital centers, of various types and ranges. The battlefield will not just be the border front.

In practice, both we and the enemy know that their air defense systems, including aviation, are focused on one target: drones. This is why we consider this the most challenging scenario. The enemy must know, and they do know, that in a full-scale war, they will face a different kind of momentum from drones and other weapons. What they see today is entirely different from what they will face. The enemy knows what is happening now, as the air force is heavily constrained. Therefore, there is a constant question among the enemy's political and military leaders: What prevents Hezbollah from targeting any strategic or sensitive objective?"

The air force commander emphasizes, "We are now in a crucial testing ground. We have learned a lot in a few months. At the beginning of the war, the success rate was low. But over time, things reversed. After we became acquainted with our enemy, learned from the field, and introduced new tactics, the scales tipped, effectiveness increased, and the success rate improved. We say that in the air force, our limits are the sky.

We work day and night, knowing that the enemy is not complacent. We have reached a stage where we can identify their weaknesses and anticipate their moves. While the enemy was confident that we could not match them, they are now shocked because they do not know how our drones can go and return when all other aircraft are affected by jamming. When we say we are working on solutions, it means that all experts in the resistance axis are working on this, including our brothers in the IRGC in Iran."

Regarding operational mechanisms, the jihadi commander notes, "Before the war, we needed special permission to know how to operate our reconnaissance drones. Now, the war has opened the door to all kinds of tests. Even though we are constrained by the scope and nature of our work, we do not stop working. We have a principle based on Imam Ali's saying that 'war is the uncle of vigilance,' meaning that the team remains constantly anxious and thinking about everything, both what we have and what the enemy might do. We prepare, develop, and seek new things. What helps us in the air force is that drones are very dynamic and flexible for development, and we can add all new technologies to everything we haven't used from drones."

The jihadi commander also refers to advanced technologies in the drone world, stating, "There are aspects related to artificial intelligence. Everyone knows that the Supreme Leader, Sayyed Ali Khamenei, said years ago that 2021 would be the year of artificial intelligence and urged everyone to focus on this field. We consider the leader's request as an order. The 'israeli' or American enemy cannot claim to monopolize this knowledge. We entered this field even before the leader's recommendation. Therefore, we confidently say that the enemy has seen only a small part of our strength and will see more."

The enemy is haunted by the "Karar" drone: Hezbollah's technical superiority has amazed our army and terrified us.

The enemy's media's focus on drones that "target our forces along the border" has sparked an interest in retrieving all the information leaked by the "israeli" military and its agencies about the drones that Hezbollah is believed to possess. The enemy's press has sharply criticized the current failure, especially since the enemy had announced last year that it had successfully conducted an exercise in the north to repel an attack by dozens of drones simultaneously.

The "Walla" website revisited a time when everyone knew that the threat from drones "became tangible after the Ukraine-Russia war, but our army did not prepare properly and did not find an effective solution. Worse still, Hezbollah managed to destroy the military facility of the 'Tal Shamayim' balloon, which was supposed to monitor, identify, and warn of threats. Furthermore, Hezbollah is showing us drones that carry missiles which can be launched at targets, and it does not seem that the Iron Dome is performing its job."

Sky Dew ("Tal Shamayim" in Hebrew)

After the "Elkosh" operation, the enemy's media demanded that the head of the Air Force, General Tomer Bar, explain what was happening. A report from Maariv stated: "Hezbollah has turned the Galilee into a research and development lab for weapons, producing precise and deadly arms in preparation for a large-scale confrontation with "israel"." Meanwhile, Haaretz urged the public not to "believe the Chief of Staff; he is living in a movie. We are not prepared for a war in Lebanon; this would lead to massive destruction in the Galilee and attacks on Haifa and Gush Dan."

Others raised more sensitive questions, such as: "Hezbollah's air superiority continues to astonish "israel". How long will Hezbollah be able to use its drones freely in "israeli" airspace? It has become clear that in the next war, Lebanese skies will not be under the control of the Air Force." Then came the cry from former Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who said: "Everything we are seeing from Hezbollah now is just an experiment. They are simply trying to learn about our defense system, our air defenses, the nature of our response, and its speed."

Military personnel justified the failure by saying that "Hezbollah possesses very small drones. Also, there is the flight time, as the army does not have much time to prepare and intercept. Additionally, the terrain of the Galilee is very complex and difficult."

After Hezbollah released surveillance videos under the name "The Hoopoe" (Al-Hudhud), the criticism reached a new level. Hadshot Bazman reported: "You are lucky as a settler because you do not know most of the information about the north; otherwise, you would not sleep at night. Hezbollah's drones do not need a visa, and they are controlled remotely via cameras with an operator in the control room. What you do not know will not kill you now, and they are telling us: We are here, inside you, planning, and capable of delivering harsh strikes."

Maariv added: "The Air Force has been asleep at the wheel for years." The sarcasm reached the point where one person wrote: "I lost a black leather wallet at Haifa Port; we hope Hezbollah will locate it accurately and professionally."

Journalists reported that Hezbollah revealed drones it possessed in November 2004 when it "managed to bring the 'Marsad' [drone] into "israeli" airspace for 18 minutes and skillfully returned it to the place it launched from in Lebanon. Since then, 18 years have passed in building and enhancing this force, mainly with the help of security industries, the army, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard."

The enemy is also constantly haunted by the "Karar" drone. Calcalist published a report stating: "'Israel's' security has become elusive with the presence of the 'Karar' drone in Hezbollah's arsenal," noting that the "Karar" was developed from the American "Striker" drone, with modifications including moving the engine from the belly to the back, increasing fuel tank capacity, adjusting the wings, and reducing weight to increase flight speed. Its toughness and durability were also improved. It is a multi-role offensive drone capable of flying up to a range of 1,000 kilometers, with speeds between 700 and 900 km/h. It can reach altitudes of 35,000 feet like a fighter jet or descend to tree top level like a cruise missile to evade detection. It carries a versatile 225 kg "MK 82" bomb and releases it as if it were an F-16 fighter jet.

Karar drone

The "Karar" drone has proven its ability to shoot down an American reconnaissance aircraft. Instead of using a standard fragmentation bomb, Hezbollah can equip the "Karar" with an armor-piercing cluster bomb to threaten tanks and facilities, or it can attach a lightweight anti-ship torpedo or a runway-busting bomb that can disable airports. A senior officer in a key position within the air defense system currently stationed in northern occupied Palestine summarizes the situation with Hezbollah's drones as follows:

"Practically, a soldier in the air force control room sees a suspicious mark of an aircraft and must decide within seconds whether it is an enemy, a bird, a civilian aircraft, or an "israeli" military vessel. He marks it, alerts about the threat, selects the interception method, and ensures the target is hit. We have had a few cases where we launched intercept missiles at birds. Often, our assets flying in the combat zone have radar signatures similar to those of Hezbollah drones. Occasionally, an "israeli" army unit might operate a drone without any prior notice. Sometimes, we have mistakenly shot down our own drones."

Intelligence and Military Confrontation and High-Tech Systems: What Are The Details of the Electronic Warfare Between the Resistance and the Enemy?

The leader in the resistance's air force says, "Throughout Hezbollah's efforts to enhance its capabilities in all aspects, it faced an 'israeli' war that people are not aware of. There was significant 'israeli' intelligence effort to determine what we were doing and what capabilities we had acquired. Over the years, the enemy has done many things to deter the resistance or deny it many things."

He added, "During all this time, the enemy worked against us. It was expected that they would put all their efforts into preventing us from forming an air force or air defense capable of facing the challenges with them. The enemy worked according to a multi-level program that included:

Firstly: Preventing us from arming ourselves with these capabilities. This involved threatening any company that cooperates with us or punishing it, and working on destroying production factories. The enemy attacked Iranian companies and threatened European companies, and tried to deceive us by sending materials that would spoil the product. They succeeded in some of their attempts but failed many times. In this war, the enemy discovered that what they thought they had succeeded in was an illusion.

Secondly: Establishing a security and military program to prevent these capabilities from reaching the resistance in Lebanon, whether by bombing goods during their transit towards us or by targeting weapons in their locations before they could be used. However, what is happening today on the front lines indicates the level of the enemy's failure."

The jihadist leader adds that the enemy, "after acknowledging that these capabilities are now available to us, resorted to new steps focused on the world of technical intelligence, using various types of detection radars, including the Iron Dome 2084 Elm radar, the Patriot radar which has proven to be a failure and seems to be on its way out of the field with the announcement of its failure, and the tactical radars relied upon more against low-altitude drones like the RPS 42. Additionally, they rely on 'friendly radars' such as those from UN teams and countries in the region."

أنواع الرادارات

EL/M - 2084

المدى الأدنى: 1.8كلم

المدى الأقصى: 350 كلم

ملاحظات: رادار دفاع جوي متعدد المهام لكشف الأهداف الجوية

التوصيف: رادارات الكشف والمراقبة الجوية

EL/M - 2258

المدى الأقصى
الأهداف المنخفضة «صواريخ 25 كلم» الأهداف النفاثة «طائرات»: 125 كلم

التوصيف: رادار محمول على متن سفن حربية

MW 08

القطع البحرية المحمول عليها: الفرقاطة اليونانية (HYDRA) الكورفت الإندونيسي (SULTANHASANUDINN)

نوع التهديد: تهديد ناتج عن قوات اليونيفيل

HADR HR - 3000

المدى الأقصى: 320 كلم

المدى الأدنى: 1.5 كلم

التوصيف: رادارات الكشف الجوي بعيد المدى

EL/M - 2226

المدى الأقصى: 60 كلم

التوصيف: رادارات المراقبة البحرية

ملاحظات: كشف الأهداف الجوية المنخفضة والأهداف التي تطفو على سطح الماء

TRS - 3D/32

نوع التهديد: تهديد ناتج من قوات اليونيفيل

المدى الأقصى: 90 – 180 كلم

القطع البحرية المحمول عليها: الفرقاطة الألمانية (MAGDERBURG)

AN/FPD - 117

المدى الأدنى: 5.8 كلم

المدى الأقصى: 470 كلم

التوصيف: رادارت الكشف الجوي بعيد المدى

Types of "israeli" radars for detecting drones (1/2)

SMART-S MK 2

المدى الأقصى:
– صواريخ: 150 كلم
– طائرات 150 كلم

نوع التهديد:
تهديد ناتج
من قوات اليونيفيل

RPS - 42

المدى الأدنى:
0.15 كلم

المدى الأقصى:
10 كلم

التوصيف:
رادارات كشف المحلّقات

DWSR 2500 C

التوصيف:
رادارات الطقس

المدى الأقصى:
240 كلم

ملاحظات:
يُستفاد منه في كشف
حركة المسيّرات نتيجة قدرته
على التعامل مع الأهداف
ذات البصمة الرادارية الضعيفة

EL/M 2083

ملاحظات:
محمول
على منطاد

المدى الأقصى:
500 كلم

التوصيف:
لكشف ومراقبة
الأهداف الجوية
المنخفضة

EL/M - 2084

المدى الأدنى:
2.25 كلم

المدى الأقصى:
100 كلم

التوصيف:
رادارات الكشف
والمراقبة الجوية

ملاحظات:
رادار سطح مدفعي متعدد المهام
يعمل على تحديد دقيق لموقع
أنظمة الأسلحة المعادية كقذائف
المدفعية والصاروخية، بالإضافة
إلى رصد جوي للأهداف الجوية

ASELSAN 51D (MAR-D)

المدى الأقصى:
70 كلم

القطع البحرية
المحمول عليها:
الكورفت التركي
(BEYKOZ)

نوع التهديد:
تهديد ناتج من
قوات اليونيفيل

AN/MPQ - 53

المدى الأدنى:
3 كلم

المدى الأقصى:
170 كلم

التوصيف:
رادارات الدفاع الجوي

ملاحظات:
رادار دفاع جوي متعدد المهام،
كشف، تعقب، وتحديد موقع
الطائرات وتحديد الصديق من
العدو بالإضافة إلى مهمة التوجيه
الصاروخي لمنظومة الباتريوت

EL/M - 2084

المدى الأدنى:
0.938 كلم

المدى الأقصى:
200 كلم

ملاحظات:
رادار متعدد
المهام تابع
لمنظومة القبة
الحديدية المحسنة

التوصيف:
الرادارات التابعة
لمنظومات الدفاع
الفعال

Types of ""israeli" radars for detecting drones (2/2)

According to the same leader, the enemy has "utilized Saar-class warships of various types, equipped with radar systems like 'Eider Alpha' and others to detect aerial objects. They also rely on cameras, having seven types of optical and thermal cameras, which they have deployed in their strategic areas, especially along the border with us. Hence, from the very beginning, and still today, our work has been focused on destroying them."

Another dimension of this confrontation, as highlighted by the jihadist leader under the title "Electronic Warfare," is as follows: "The enemy decided to adopt the 'soft kill' approach, which is effective, low-cost, and has significant impact. They relied heavily on it. Their disappointment today stems from their failure to benefit from this principle. They worked on seven layers of electronic warfare. We know that the experts in the entity, whom we are familiar with, are currently experiencing hours of disappointment because they had relied on this system and were overly confident to the extent that they believed they would not need to activate the Iron Dome against drones."

He adds: "Over time, the enemy shifted to a 'hard kill' strategy, which involves a system using technical tools and directed weapons, such as the Patriot systems, the Iron Dome, and air defense weapons (Spider-Debby). Additionally, they have employed various helicopters and fighters, and now they have added the Vulcan (Sky Hand), which is a machine gun capable of firing 6000 rounds per minute. However, we are confident that this will not be effective against Hezbollah's tactics."

The leader in the air force says, "When we talk about electronic warfare, we mean there are methods to use the spectrum to either intercept or thwart drones, and these methods also have multiple levels.

سلاح الجو الإسرائيلي

المهام الإلكترونية

Gulfstream G550 (EITAM)
سقف التحليق الخدماتي: 41000 قدم
الوظيفة: طائرة قيادة وإنذار مبكر AEW

BEECHCRAFT RC-12
سقف التحليق الخدماتي: قيادة وسيطرة، استطلاع لاسلكي على إتصالات لا سلكية جو/جو، إعتراض إتصالات العدو والتطفل على الإنبعاثات الإلكترونية
الإرتفاع العملياتي: 20000 – 30000 قدم (6.096 – 9.144 كم)

Gulfstream G500 (SHAVIT)
الوظيفة: إستخبارات إشارة، إستطلاع شامل وإدارة عمليات
سقف التحليق الخدماتي: 41000 قدم

مقاتلات

F-16 (FIGHTING FALCON)
السرعة القصوى: 2.05 ماخ (2420 كم / ساعة) على علو شاهق
سقف الطيران: 50000 قدم (15000م)
التوصيف: طائرة مقاتلة أسرع من الصوت، تم تصميمها لتكون مقاتلة التفوق الجوي

F-15 (STRIKE EAGLE)
سقف الطيران: 50000 قدم (15000م)
السرعة القصوى: 2.5 ماخ (2655 كم / ساعة) على علو شاهق
التوصيف: طائرة مقاتلة إعتراضية وهجومية (جو-جو)

f-35 (Lockheed martin fightening)
السرعة القصوى: 1.6 ماخ (1296 كم / ساعة) على علو شاهق
سقف الطيران: 50000 قدم (15000م)
التوصيف: طائرة مقاتلة متعددة المهام الجوية والهجومية كما أنها قادرة على توفير قدرات الحرب الإلكترونية والإستخباراتية والمراقبة والإستطلاع

مسيّرات

HERON TP
السرعة القصوى: 207 كلم/س
مدة التحليق: 52 ساعة
التوصيف: طائرة تكتيكية للإستطلاع والمراقبة

HERON TP (EITAN)
السرعة القصوى: 240 كلم/س
مدة التحليق: 12000–15000 ساعة
التوصيف: طائرة استراتيجية للإستطلاع والمراقبة والإنذار المبكر

HERMES 450
السرعة القصوى: 176 كلم/س
مدة التحليق: 16–24 ساعة
التوصيف: طائرة تكتيكية للإستطلاع والمراقبة

HERMES 900
السرعة القصوى: 220 كلم/س
مدة التحليق: 36 ساعة
التوصيف: طائرة تكتيكية للإستطلاع والمراقبة

"Israeli" Air Force

What the enemy has done, even during exercises, includes:

First: Jamming Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and GPS. "israel" is among the most skilled countries in the world in this field. When they do this, it affects global navigation. But we were aware of their programs. Therefore, we thwarted their project and prepared surprises for them.

Second: Spoofing the GPS system, making the aircraft navigate without a real target, while the enemy provides it with a false location (spoofing). For example, if there is a drone in the southern airspace, it would be indicated as if it were in Beirut. This is an old method.

Third: Jamming drone control mechanisms. This was based on their monitoring of our operations during the Syrian war, and they launched a jamming operation aimed at reaching and controlling the aircraft themselves.

Fourth: Attempting to prevent the control center from receiving images from drones while they are in the air, by jamming the image-specific frequencies. But we surpassed this capability. If they want to know, we can tell them that we were receiving images while they thought they were blocking them."

Fifth: Electronic interception of drones by attempting to intercept the control channel of the drones. If successful, the enemy would then control the drones instead of us and would proceed to destroy them. This is a known tactic in this field.

""israeli" army camera

The Sa'ar warship for detecting drones

According to the resistance air force commander, "Since the 2006 war up to 'Operation Al-Aqsa Flood,' the enemy has continually engaged in large-scale exercises, both internally and concerning its forces. Their agenda has always included training to counter our air capabilities. They have focused on this aspect more intensely since 2016, related to our operations in Syria, especially as we enhanced the role of drones and electronic warfare during that period. We also have our own information on the enemy's evaluation of these exercises, which they claimed were successful. Even in 2020, they declared readiness to face any activity from us in the sky.

However, their current experience has shown that they were not successful, despite us working according to a precise level based on leadership decisions. They failed. The question before them is: How will they cope if we use what we have without constraints? How will they deal with multiple weapons operating simultaneously, including drones, missiles, air defense, and other weapons, especially since they have used tons of explosives without successfully disabling the drones?"

The commander adds that the enemy "relied heavily on early electronic detection. They detect the drone directly after launch based on the signals it emits. They were capable of this through 'SIGINT' systems, which allow them to pick up drone signals even if they are far away, and to detect the aircraft even if its RCS (Radar Cross Section) is small, as we tested from the far reaches of the Bekaa. We even tried this during the negotiations on maritime borders. On that day, we sent a drone over the 'Karis' field, and the enemy had to deploy a large number of warplanes (F-16 and F-35). What happened that day was that the enemy detected the signal but could not locate the drone, causing a major uproar in the entity."

The commander reveals "another matter, which is that the enemy deceives itself and its public when justifying the failure to intercept our drones due to their short distance or the proximity of their launch site to the target. Some drones, like those targeting the 'Tal Shamayim balloon, traveled dozens of kilometers even before entering their airspace. Yet they failed to detect them, and they reached their target. This refutes their justification. We know that there is no place in Palestine with the same density of detection and defense coverage as in northern Palestine. Therefore, the enemy should consider that if we can breach northern Palestine and hit these targets, how much easier it would be to do so in the interior, in "Tel Aviv", "Eilat", and farther cities? It is much easier than bypassing Nahariya or reaching Haifa."

The commander calls on people to "understand well that the enemy deploys all its intelligence, defensive, and collection tools against us. They have reinforced their presence there. Before the war, they had 3 radars for small signatures, and when we began operating drones, the number increased to 18 radars, and then to 23. Today, there is no valley or depression without a radar, which is unusual for armies. Despite all this, our drones 'cut through and enter and exit'... We are constantly working on improving tactics, techniques, and developing them. On the level of weaponry, we rely on our own special tactics. It's like a game of chess. Even though they have made improvements, we always stay one step ahead."

Cost of Drones vs. Cost of Countering Them

In the context of the ongoing battle, there is a crucial issue concerning the cost of drone warfare. Hezbollah, ultimately, is a jihadist organization with capabilities that do not resemble those of nation-states. However, managing such a battle sometimes relies on creative ideas that make material differences secondary.

The commander of Hezbollah's air force says, "Armies usually resort to a 'economy of force' strategy, meaning they avoid wasting their capabilities. It is not wise to use substantial force against a minor threat. This has made the 'soft kill' approach fundamental to the enemy's program. They have set up a large central management system for electronic warfare to achieve this goal and abolished the previous decentralization, where the air force did one thing, and brigades did something similar but independently."

The jihadist commander adds, "The occupation army exploits this type of electronic warfare to market its products, as "israel" has gradually turned into a manufacturer and exporter of such materials used in electronic warfare. For example, the enemy is currently trying to market their laser defense systems, attempting to convince customers, including their own army, that these systems can destroy drones... But what will they say now? Will they boast that this system succeeded in melting a drone's propeller or preventing a drone from reaching its target?"

The commander notes that the enemy "has tried to cover up its failure by claiming that the resistance has prepared thousands of drones. They spend a lot on electronic warfare as a primary level of defense. In reality, the enemy has spent enormous amounts on this sector, but it has only achieved minimal results, coming in below their expectations. When they continued to work on it, we discussed among ourselves that the enemy might be deliberately hiding other capabilities from us. But it turned out otherwise, as after their failure with the 'soft kill' approach, they were forced to move directly to 'hard kill,' highlighting the significant cost differences in the battle."

The commander explains: "When the enemy activates the 'Iron Dome' system to intercept a simple reconnaissance drone, they are forced to launch at least four missiles (each missile costs $50,000), meaning they have to spend $200,000. When this fails, they turn to fighter jets. Each hour of enemy fighter jet operation costs over $40,000, not including the cost of missiles used against the drone, and the significant risks involved with flying these jets, which also requires them to use helicopters. Sometimes they fail, but their fear of the drone reaching its target may force them to use Patriot missiles, with each missile costing $3 million. This also does not guarantee the drone's destruction. In practice, the enemy spends millions of dollars to counter a drone that costs less than $2,500. When discussing costs, we are not belittling our drones, but it relates to how technology is used. This impacts the essence of production. Some drones are purchased by armies for half a million dollars. However, we can produce a version of it for less than $5,000, adding a jamming protection system. For another example, the U.S. ScanEagle squadron is bought by Jordan for $10 million, which includes 4 drones with a ground control base. The Americans prevent Jordan from performing maintenance, which is costly. However, we produce the same squadron for less than $100,000."

Iron Dome

The jihadist commander says: "The enemy's problem is that they believed the electronic warfare program would not have significant costs. They thought it would protect their economy from our air power. However, once they were forced to resort to using conventional weapons against our drones, they faced a significant financial crisis. This is all while they have yet to fully test the rest of our drones.

This issue stems from the fact that the enemy cannot assess our operational mechanisms. True, our material capabilities are not as large as theirs, and securing materials is not as easy for us as it is for them. Yet, in the end, we have managed to build factories with substantial production capacity. We do not underestimate their weapon manufacturing capabilities or their open American support. To this day, they continuously attempt everything possible to prevent the arrival of products and equipment. But, unfortunately for them, we are now in a comfortable position regarding production in terms of type, quantity, and continuity. What we use now is only a fraction of our capabilities, as the resistance leadership's decision only mandates this level of operation. The enemy knows that we are using weapons and drones that we showcased at the Mleeta Museum at least five years ago."

The commander adds, "It is useful to point out that production rates and quantity are not affected by cost. When the operational need dictates a particular weapon, we do not concern ourselves with cost alone but with the availability of that weapon. There are indeed high-cost drones, but when we find a need for them, this necessitates a specific production approach. I mean, we provide what we need in terms of weapons. More precisely, the cost of a weapon does not dictate whether we produce more than needed or not; the need and utility are the driving factors."

The commander of the air force points to the depletion of the enemy's resources, saying, "After failing to prevent drone penetration, the enemy increased the sensitivity of all their detection systems. Normally, radar detection technologies operate at a certain level to avoid triggering with the passing of birds. But the enemy's increase in sensitivity has led to full alertness. Consequently, dozens of alerts are issued daily that require sounding alarms. Do you remember when the enemy launched missiles at pelicans?

On one occasion, we launched a very inexpensive drone, and the enemy tried to intercept it, firing one missile, followed by another, and a third. In the end, it turned out they had shot down one of their own drones while our drone returned safely to its base. We are well aware of the impact of such incidents on their officers and the psychological pressure they experience, especially since false alarms drain the settlers."

The jihadist commander believes that the enemy "is leading its society into a war of attrition it cannot sustain. They are implementing everything they have trained for over the past 18 years. They are fighting us at a level that is lower than our own. We do not consider what is happening now to be a comprehensive war. However, if we enter a total war scenario with no red lines, the scenario will take them to a point where they cannot endure. Enemy officers should start preparing answers to their people's questions about the effectiveness of all they have trained for and all they have spent since 2006!"

Regarding the Iron Dome system, the commander of the air force says it "achieved success in Gaza, but it is not a complete success. The reason is logistical difficulties faced by our jihadist brothers in Palestine, but the situation is different with us. We have turned the Iron Dome into a 'mockery.' One day, when the resistance reveals what we have done and are doing in northern Palestine, everyone will understand why we call it a 'mockery.'"

"Some time ago, the enemy claimed they shot down one of our drones over Nahariya. But they are lying; the drone went and came back, and we might release the video to expose their lie, especially since the enemy knows our drones directly attacked the Dome. It is well known that the Dome is a radar system intended to detect drones, and there is a 'launcher' waiting for orders to fire missiles at the drone. What happens is that the drone bypasses the radar and hits the missile launcher. We have full documentation of these operations. The enemy knows the extent of their failure. If they are supposed to detect the drone from 80 km, 40 km, or even 20 km away, what will they say when the drone is right over the radar and the launcher and is recording? What else can this be called but a colossal failure? When we show pictures and videos disproving the enemy's claims, what will they say, and what will other army leaders say? The sight of the drone flying over the radar and then returning safely to its base should be enough for the world to understand how the enemy lies."

Iron Dome

The commander himself points out that "armies usually resort to plans to strike drones through large defenses. This has happened with Russia in Syria and in Ukraine as well. Therefore, our approach to countering the enemy's defenses is not limited to identifying their weaknesses; rather, we have aimed to operate at a level higher than theirs. What is happening now represents the greatest challenge for the enemy, both the military and intelligence, though perhaps their public is unaware.

We focus on their strengths to hit them. Our goal is to undermine their defensive doctrine based on the principle of deterrence. They now know that Hezbollah has not been deterred. We have surpassed the concept of deterrence. They are losing their advantage in early warning. The enemy also knows that we can strike the giant balloon with a highly accurate missile, but we opted for 'economy of force' and hit the balloon with a simple weapon like a drone. This strikes at the enemy's core... We target their centers of power. We have hit more than one radar, especially the Iron Dome radar that they boast about, claiming it is of American manufacture. The creator of this radar once said: if you throw a baseball over Beirut, this radar will detect it. But what happened? Our drones hover right above it, going several times, returning, and recording before they pounce on it and destroy the associated missile launchers. There are more targets that the resistance has not announced. We have targeted precise items. The enemy officers and specialists know what affects them."

The air force commander says, "The success in intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities has not yet been fully revealed. But the enemy knows that when alarm sirens go off during the day or at midnight and then they claim it's a false alarm, they are not telling the truth. They do not know exactly what happened. There are many things the enemy has not been aware of, such as what happened in 'Hadera' or Haifa. When we put in effort, it is focused on processing images and videos; the effort is not in gathering these materials. The enemy's public should know that the information collected by the resistance 'ruins their day.' We have what can dismantle the enemy's work over years. True, they imposed a 'blurring' of many locations in their domain on Google, but they know that we have 'removed the fog and know everything.' We possess a real treasure of hundreds of thousands of materials that define a very large target bank. The decision to strike and hit these targets is solely up to the leadership."

The Hezbollah Drone Family

The diversity within Hezbollah's drone capabilities is no longer a secret. While the enemy, Western intelligence, and even some Arab agencies talk about the data they have gathered, Hezbollah maintains a strategy of "constructive ambiguity," revealing only what aligns with its plans.

In this context, the commander of the Islamic Resistance's air force says, "We have a variety of drones. Each category is distinguished by its nature and function. In terms of missions, there are drones that collect battle-specific data. These drones previously operated in the 'buffer zone,' but their scope has expanded. They have reached Tiberias (Hassan drone 2022), as well as Ashdod (south of "Tel Aviv"), in addition to what was announced about the 'Ayoub' drone in 2012.

During the Syrian war, the leadership allowed us multiple entries into the Golan Heights. In peacetime, we conducted intelligence flights, but with a certain depth. After 'Tsunami of Al-Aqsa,' we adjusted our methods. When the Secretary-General asked us to expand our operational range, we did so, but to the extent that could be publicly declared, reaching beyond Haifa. We are talking about intelligence efforts, including day and night operations. There are both still images and videos."

The commander adds that Hezbollah has drones dedicated to "distraction." "They can be suddenly converted into diving or intelligence drones. The key is their presence in the air. We use them for various purposes related to other operations we are undertaking, especially as the enemy's alertness is very high. The enemy is now aware that we send drones to trigger their defense systems.

Hezbollah drones' types
- **Surveillance**
  - Al-Nawras
  - Mersad
  - Muhajer
  - Ayoub
- **Offensive**
  - T1
  - T2
- **Diving**
  - Sahab
- **Distraction**
  - Ababil
- **Unknown:**
  - Three models

However, due to their extreme tension, they do not know how to handle any drone they see. They struggle to justify their mistakes. For example, when we targeted a gathering of enemy forces near the "Elkosh" settlement, the enemy provided ridiculous and embarrassing excuses. They claimed that Hezbollah had breached the detection system at the "Meron" base and disabled it, giving us a significant achievement just to explain their failure. Nevertheless, the public no longer believes them. 'Yedioth Ahronoth' wrote that enough excuses have been given regarding the failure of air defenses."

The commander in the air force points out that there are "distraction drones, diving drones, offensive drones, and also logistical drones (for transport, leaflet dropping, delivering supplies to 'friends'). This is what we can disclose. Sometimes, we use more than one drone for a single mission. For example, we might have a diving drone performing a mission, and at the same time, a drone above it doing the filming.

There are offensive drones that launch projectiles at specific targets. The enemy knows that there are smaller, lighter, smart, or precision missiles. There is also the offensive 'Sijil' drone, which has its unique features. As for the ranges, it's extensive. Sayyed Hassan mentioned from "Kiryat Shmona" to "Eilat", and we execute and tell him, 'Wherever you want, to honor you.' But, let's consider what our brothers in Ansarallah are doing, having reached "Eilat", "Tel Aviv", and Haifa. We say that the enemy, compared to what Ansarallah is doing since they started in 2015, while we started before them, can only imagine what we have!"

The jihadist commander says there is a type of drone that falls under the title of "multi-copter," which performs "hovering," meaning it is essentially a drone, and we manufacture it with various types of engines. It can perform all tasks. However, the matter varies in terms of range and time; it can operate over tens of kilometers but is highly effective in direct engagement with ground forces. We haven't used it yet. A fighter can control and manage it. Besides, its manufacturing cost is low. It can be produced very close to the battle site. It is considered a tactical weapon, and the enemy fears it in an open war situation because of its tremendous effectiveness against infantry forces."

Ababil T1 offensive drone

Ababil T2 offensive drone

According to the jihadist commander, the enemy "has an army of the best people who study their adversary and learn lessons quickly. They are swift in implementation. Every time a site is targeted, they immediately take measures. At the beginning of the war, they withdrew their soldiers from the front positions. Some sites now have only a very few soldiers. They resorted to selecting new locations throughout the north to station the soldiers they brought in, using open areas like plains (with 20 or 30 personnel carriers and armored vehicles with soldiers deployed in a wide field). After the first operation we carried out, they then dispersed the soldiers under trees. Each time they choose a new location. Sometimes, we conduct reconnaissance on a specific target, and when we return to strike it, we find that they have moved it due to sensing the danger. This process is exhausting for the soldiers, especially those coming from the reserves."

The commander explains that each drone has "clear (Online) objectives, meaning we have assigned it a specific mission. There are also unresolved (Offline) targets, meaning the drone is on a specific mission, and during its operation, it discovers a target that can be added, updating our objectives. Even the idea of conducting an attack is possible during the mission. One can imagine whether we can or cannot do everything, including colliding with enemy aircraft.

The enemy classifies our drones as stealthy, meaning they can infiltrate and hide from radars, executing the mission without or before being detected. Even detection is not easy. The challenge here isn't limited to radars. For example, we have drones with a low signature, high thermal signature, and loud sound, and their size makes them more visible. However, the enemy has not detected them due to the combination of optical, thermal, and physical efforts that hinder the enemy's mission. Hence, the occupation army involves everyone in the mission. On the front line now, the army has given settlers phone numbers to call upon hearing any sound they suspect to be a drone. But we resorted to a specific tactic, and the operation was remarkably successful."

Regarding the warhead weights, the air force commander says, "They vary. They start from a few kilograms and can be increased significantly. We are not talking about tons, but now our drones can carry warheads with significant weights. From the enemy's experience over the past nine months, they know we have different weapons that have enabled us to reach the target. They understand what it means for our drones to be able to carry a missile. The enemy knows the issue is not related to weight, as we have conducted operations with small weights that achieved high results. As for control, the enemy says our drones are equipped with optical guidance heads allowing remote control. Fine, what's new? The question for them is: what have you done to face this challenge?"

How did Hezbollah's needle deflate the legendary balloon?

Tal Shamyim (SKY DEW) balloon

"How does the enemy explain to its people the story of the 'Tal Shamayim' balloon? They spent hundreds of millions of dollars on it. It has a highly advanced radar. Suddenly, a drone manages to penetrate all defenses, and the enemy only detects it at the last moment. Despite this, this small drone brings down a balloon unlike any other in the Middle East.

The reconnaissance operation played a significant and effective role. We discussed the idea of bringing down the balloon while it was in the air. In the end, we found that the most suitable military option was to strike it on the ground. We did not have to chase it at an altitude of 7000 meters, even though we are capable of that.

The enemy launched propaganda claiming they are ahead of us in everything. Yoav Gallant stood near the balloon and confidently talked about his forces advancing while Hezbollah retreats. Suddenly, out of nowhere, a small drone arrives, swoops down on the balloon, and completely disables it."

These words were spoken by a commander in Hezbollah's air force when discussing the operation to bring down the balloon. This operation took place less than four months after the enemy's defense minister stood on a platform beneath the giant balloon, surrounded by air force and intelligence officers. He didn't need more arrogance while talking about the 'collapse of equations Hezbollah thought it created in Lebanon.'

Gallant spoke with what seemed like certainty from his security and military systems, which assured him that this balloon supports the air force's operations. It was the same air force that was shocked when news of a 'bad incident' in the north arrived. Before the censorship allowed the publication of brief news, Hezbollah released a video explaining the aerial reconnaissance operation of the 'giant surveillance balloon,' followed by additional footage showing a Hezbollah drone successfully reaching, hitting, and destroying the balloon.

The mood in 'israel' quickly shifted. Commentators mocked their military and security leaders. One wrote about the 'air bubble of the surveillance balloon,' saying: 'Beyond crushing ego and undermining security resilience, the collapse of the advanced surveillance balloon overshadows a long-term strategic problem in the 'israeli' security concept.'"

The "Tal Shamayim" balloon was considered the most capable and advanced platform for gathering intelligence according to the "israeli" Air Force. It is the largest of its kind in the world, with no equivalent in the entire Middle East. It was developed over several years through a joint program between the "Wall Directorate" in the "israeli" Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency. It was transported from America in disassembled containers and assembled by specialized American teams.

Its foreign name is "SKY DEW," known in Hebrew as "Tal Shamayim" or "Sky Dew" in Arabic. It is stationed in the Ilania area and operates according to the Aerostat (HAAS) system. It was designed to provide early warning of long-range missile attacks and long-range drone attacks. It can detect various threats at both long and low levels, feeding threat and targeting data to "israel's" multi-layered air defense units.

The balloon carries a suite of electronic intelligence systems, including dozens of electro-optical systems, long-range radars, signal intelligence systems, and both active and passive communication equipment. It can track low-altitude targets and those in valleys. The primary sensor in the balloon is the advanced radar system "SKY DEW," where the radar antenna, electronics, and related communication systems are mounted inside a large inflatable fabric forebody under the gas-filled stable pressure envelope of the balloon. It includes a tether with fiber optic data cables, allowing data communication between the balloon and its ground station through secure fiber optic data links.

On May 16, while it was stationed on the ground, a small and inexpensive drone breached its envelope, causing the balloon to [explode](#) and be [destroyed](#). One of the enemy's wealthy donors, who generously supports the state and its military projects—a PhD in philosophy and a businessman named Shmuel Harlav—was dismayed by the event. He wrote in "Yedioth Ahronoth" that "the balloon explosion is a breach by Hezbollah comparable to Hamas's breach of the separation wall and fences on October 7. In the north and south of the country, the arrogance of 'israeli' technological and intelligence superiority was shattered, causing strategic damage to 'israel's' security."