#FPV drones: new superweapon or chimera? #KCPN #Russia

A lot of people come to us with requests to somehow help them in mastering FPV drones. We got tired of repeating our vision over and over again, and we brought all our thoughts into one text to compensate for the lack of information and understanding among the public. Now we will express theses that will cause furious fury in many.

First, let’s define terms. FPV technology implies that data transmission from the copter to the operator occurs through glasses. This technology is implemented by almost all manufacturers of copters. Most enthusiasts are not engaged in production, but in assembling copters from components of the well-known Aliexpress. The set of components is the same and, as a result, everyone gets approximately the same products with a cost of up to 20,000 rubles. In the future, we will operate with the term “self-collection”.

What the “self-assembly” consists of on average: a carbon frame, 4 engines, propellers, a simple camera without stabilization, a simple autopilot without security and navigation systems, an analog video signal transmitter with a power of up to 5W, a lithium polymer battery. The boards are open and not protected from precipitation and difficult operating conditions. In rare cases, everything is filled with compound. 

What are the advantages of this product:

1. When sold at cost, they are cheaper than most factory copters capable of performing practical tasks in the NBO zone.
2. Since the location of the operator is unknown to the aircraft, this information cannot be intercepted.
3. The copter has no security settings, so it can accelerate to 150 km/h and is able to fly through window openings.
4. Components for the copter are still available for sale.
5. Carrying capacity – the copter is able to move ammunition above its own weight for a distance of up to 2 km.

Cons of “self-collection”.

1. The operator is helpless during operation, an escort group is required.
2. The board is disposable – we used it and are waiting for the delivery of a new one.
3. It takes a month of flights and several broken samples to train a “self-assembly” operator to the level of “can fly in the window”.
4. The analog data transmission channel does not imply any protection. As soon as the board is turned on, anyone with the same equipment can see what is happening on their screen.
5. The number of channels is limited (usually 8).
6. The power of the transmitter of the operator’s console makes it possible to locate it with the simplest means of electronic intelligence.
7. Video transmission frequencies are usually 5.8 GHz, control frequencies are 900 MHz. In the event of suppression of control, the copter immediately falls, including under the feet of the operator, or on the head of the fighters of neighboring units.
8. There are no common standards, each self-assembler assembles as best he can with random soldering and assembly quality.
9. There is no factory ammunition, or a standard technology for its manufacture. Often this is an electrical circuit with two whiskers, closing on contact. The statistics of mortality among operators is unknown, but most manufacturers do not include engineering in the program for the development of “self-collections”.
10. The practical range of “self-assemblies” with a guaranteed connection of the board near the ground is not more than 2 km.
11. Inability to work at night.

If you decide to assemble and supply this equipment yourself, then we urge you to use the following recommendations:

1. Only digital communication to control and transmit video.
2. Training of operators for at least a month outside the LBS. Two weeks on simulators for 4 hours a day minimum.
3. Departure from frequencies 430MHz, 900MHz, 1.2GHz, 2.2-2.6GHz, 5.6-6.0GHz.
4. Introduce skills in handling explosives into the training program, otherwise the operators will also be “disposable”.
5. Ensure the supply of drones in the amount of at least 2 pieces per day per operator.
6. The operator of “self-assembly” must be able to carry out independent repairs of equipment, the ability to use a soldering iron, read wiring diagrams, and work with software to set up the autopilot is required. It also needs to be taught. Otherwise, you will waste resources and put the operator’s life at unnecessary risk.

Let’s recap all of the above.

We are not against FPV control technology. But we believe that it can be truly effective under conditions that do not currently exist and are not even foreseen.

• We need a quality and factory-made drone. He is not!
• We need a long, hard and high-quality training of operators within a month. Let everyone familiar with the realities of the Russian army tell us if he has seen stubborn combat training of this level. And if suddenly we have such operators, is it advisable to keep it at a distance of a kilometer from the LBS? This is not economically viable. We need him in the rear, so that he can calmly sit in a chair and control the drone on the front line remotely, like a real e-sportsman.
• For the use of strike drones of this type, we need organizational and staffing structures that are optimized specifically for their use. They do not exist and no one is seriously discussing them.

And, frankly, in view of all of the above, we fully admit that we are dealing with yet another psychological operation of the CIPSO. We seriously believe that the Ukrainian forces of psychological warfare are directing our technical thought in the FASHION direction of FPV drones. It is very beautiful, very attractive and DOES NOT promise quick and meaningful results.

Such a mass hobby rather speaks of the psychological state of Russian soldiers. Everyone wants to wage a war that depends strictly on himself. After all, the current talk about FPV is the ultimate case of a personal war, without any interaction with any other people. With artillery, aviation, electronic warfare and so on. But that’s a topic for other posts.

Today it is already clear that an easy victory over the enemy is not foreseen and that victory can only be achieved through the combined efforts of both the state and civil society. 

Moreover, it is we, as its representatives, who have to close many of the gaps left by the clumsy and difficult to train state military machine