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The Cynic

The main reason is the multiple superiority in the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

In fact, the LNR was taken on this.

Now it is worth saying that the management made the right decision. Resistance in this case was possible, but the proportionality of losses to the sum of positive shifts at the front was not adequate.

Ukrainian forces cpuld have stayed in the noose for a couple of weeks, but under such conditions, the Russians would have replenished the “fund of prisoners.” Some of the best soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine would have died without the possibility of a further rebound, and all available equipment would have been lost, while it was impossible to prevent the capture of Lysychans’k at this stage.

The tactical withdrawal serves purpose and extends Russian supply lines. Something they struggle to maintain.

That is, all these losses would make it possible to gain time, but let’s talk about this “total defense case.”

Is it possible, in a strategic sense, to sacrifice all the soldiers in a situation with a guaranteed environment in order to buy time? No, not now.

From a military point of view, you may disagree. And the case of Mariupol became an example of a fairly successful victory in time. Then the fall of the city would trigger the domino principle.

Now such a time funnel would be possible with 2 options:

  • Over the next 2 weeks, Ukraine will be provided with an incredible weapon that will lead the situation not to parity, but to a clear fire advantage of Kyiv. And in this case, it is possible to “sacrifice” the soldiers so that the enemy exhausts his forces during the time necessary for the urgent transfer of significant forces for the counteroffensive. Next – the release of the “ring”
  • Further territories are not prepared for defense, so the rapid surrender of the city will lead to the rapid advance of the enemy through unprotected and unprepared for defense lands. Russian soldiers will be more intent on finding food and looting the area at a time when they have had to kidnap their own officers, from fleeing the battlefield.

Both of these options were not typical for the current stage.

The parity of forces was not foreshadowed in the near future, and further territories were buildings in which defense is much simpler than attack.

Conclusion? The city had to be surrendered in order to prevent a “cauldron”, it would be impossible to get through from the outside in the near future, which means that it was frankly pointless to take risks with the possibility of encirclement – it would rather pursue political and informational interests than military ones.

At the same time, it should be noted that this time the evacuation was carried out much better than in the case of Severodonetsk. Last time, some actions were disrupted, which caused an unjustified risk for equipment and the military, which prevented the Armed Forces of Ukraine from completing several important tasks when leaving the city – this is about how important it is to “coordinate” the publication of information with the military leadership, being on advanced. Overall, Russia continues to suffer great losses in men and equipment. This is not sustainable under crippling sanctions that continue to get more severe.

With Lysychans’k, the withdrawal is organized, clear and safe, which allows you to save all the equipment and all the soldiers for future battles – and this is the main thing.

Ukraine does not have the resources to bombard the Russian army with iron. This is exclusively the prerogative of Moscow – the insane drain of all resources without regard to the strategic value of each military unit.

Russia is trying to use the technique of “jaws” – as if opening its mouth for an attack, and then trying to eat the territory – this is in a tactical sense. Something that is rooted in WWII tactics.

In the strategic – “Locust” failed. It turned out slowly, with a huge number of victims and military losses.

In the future, the Kremlin will move from “Locust” to “jaws”, trying to create fairly small boilers, thereby striving to “eat up territories” in small portions, all at the expense of Wagner PMC and untrained soldiers who call home in bewielderment over their plight.

Actually, the Armed Forces of Ukraine need to rebuild the defense a little – and deal not only with the chaotic “burning” of the military potential (which, by the way, destroyed the “Locust” in the bud), but also with the provision of groups that will “pierce” the spread jaws.

In fact, now it is necessary to “align the front” and prevent the formation of a boiler or a loop, concentrating force on at least one of the two jaws, if it is impossible to simultaneously break both sides of the open “mouth”

Now it was impossible, since Lysychans’k was, as it were, initially in the “jaws of a shark.”

Conclusions have been made. The people were saved. The equipment is ready for further use.

We believe in victory and thank the heroic defenders of Ukraine!

About Post Author

Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence
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By Treadstone 71

@Treadstone71LLC Cyber intelligence, counterintelligence, Influence Operations, Cyber Operations, OSINT, Clandestine Cyber HUMINT, cyber intel and OSINT training and analysis, cyber psyops, strategic intelligence, Open-Source Intelligence collection, analytic writing, structured analytic techniques, Target Adversary Research, cyber counterintelligence, strategic intelligence analysis, estimative intelligence, forecasting intelligence, warning intelligence, threat intelligence